National Arbitration Center
Title: Polk County and Polk County Deputy Sheriff's
Association IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
This
Arbitration arises pursuant to Agreement between Polk County Deputy Sheriff's
Association ("Association"), and Polk County ("County"),
under which LUELLA E. NELSON was selected to serve as Arbitrator and under
which her Award shall be final and binding upon the parties. Hearing
was held on March 25, 1996, in Dallas, Oregon.
The parties had the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
introduce relevant exhibits, and argue the issues in dispute.
Both parties filed post-hearing briefs on or about April 16, 1996. APPEARANCES: On
behalf of the Association: Mark J. Makler, Esquire, Hoag, Garrettson, Goldberg & Fenrich, 1313
NW 19th Avenue, Portland, OR 97209 On
behalf of the County: David Doyle, Esquire, County Counsel, Polk County, Polk County
Courthouse, Dallas, OR 97338
ISSUE Was the imposition of discipline for just cause; and, if so, was the
discipline imposed progressive? RELEVANT SECTIONS OF AGREEMENT Article 32 - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE ... (D)
Step IV. ... The
arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding, but the arbitrator shall
have no power to alter, modify, add to or detract from the terms of this
Agreement. The arbitrator's
decision shall be within the scope and terms of this Agreement and in writing.
The arbitrator's decision shall include detailed findings and
conclusions, together with an explanation of the reasoning utilized in making
the decision(s). ... Article 35 - DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE ... (B)
Minor or first Step Actions.
Disciplinary actions such as written letters of warning or caution are
usually first steps taken in constructive and progressive discipline. As a general rule, such are to be taken for infractions of a
minor nature. (C)
More Serious or Secondary Actions.
Disciplinary actions such as ... suspension, ... will be used for more
serious offenses or when previous disciplinary actions have not corrected
unacceptable patterns of performance or misconduct. (D)
Administration of Discipline.
Disciplinary actions will be administered promptly, in a fair and
equitable manner, and only for just cause. ...
FACTS Grievant
is a Deputy Sheriff in the Polk County Sheriff's Department (the Department).
He received a three-day suspension, based on the charge that he filed
an untruthful report. The report
involved a complaint of reckless driving made by a female citizen (identified
herein as [W]) on the evening of May 11, 1995.
The notice of suspension was not introduced in evidence.
According to Lt. Robert Wolfe, the basis for the discipline was that
Grievant failed to write truthful information in an official document and
placed false information in a public document.
The County acknowledges that, if Grievant's written report was not
untruthful, then no basis for discipline exists from this incident. [W's]
Calls to Dispatch The
parties agree that [W] called the Department twice on May 11 regarding the
reckless driving incident. The precise contents of the second call are unclear.
Police Clerk Laura Sue Dilts testified she reviewed tapes for May 11
and 12 for eight hours. She found [W's] second call to Dispatch in that process.
Her recollection was that [W] said she could not identify the driver,
and may have said she could identify the passenger.
Sheriff Ray Steele testified he had a transcript of the call in his
file, but did not recall its contents. Lt.
Wolfe did not testify to the call's contents. The
Response to [W's] Report Lt.
Wolfe investigated the swing shift activity on May 11 because of an unrelated
incident the same evening, known as the "Black Rock" incident.
The Black Rock incident involved the discovery of a dead body after a
delay in receiving and responding to a request to check on the welfare of the
deceased. Grievant received a
letter of reprimand as a result of his involvement in the Black Rock incident. On
May 11, Grievant was serving as Field Training Officer for Deputy Bernie
Krauger. He shadowed Deputy
Krauger and assisted him with his calls, and also covered calls in his own
area. [W's] complaint was
dispatched generally at 21:17. Grievant
advised Dispatch that all units were out of position.
Grievant asked to have the case assigned to himself at 22:31.
At that point, Deputy Krauger asked whether he should respond, since
the call involved his area. Grievant
told him not to "get greedy." Grievant
testified Deputy Krauger needed to complete work at the office that evening. In
his investigation of swing shift activities, Lt. Wolfe noticed that Grievant
cleared [W's] report immediately upon receiving it.
Lt. Wolfe testified it is not unusual for an officer to initially clear
a call when he is out of the area, then follow up later.
Grievant's report listed the names, address, and telephone number of
the vehicle owner (herein referred to as [AL]) and the vehicle owner's father
(herein referred to as [PL]); and contained the following handwritten entry: [AL]
owner of P/U, (not at home) talked to [PL] and informed him of reckless drive.
[W] was unable to I.D. driver. [PL]
stated he would be grounding his son because of the incident. Lt.
Wolfe testified he contacted [W] on May 12 or 13 to see if action on [W's]
call made Grievant unavailable to respond in the Black Rock incident.
[W] told him no one from the Department had contacted her.
Lt. Wolfe initially testified he found that surprising because of
the entry in Grievant's report. On
cross examination, Lt. Wolfe acknowledged he had not yet seen Grievant's
report at the time he spoke to [W], and only saw it at some point after May
16. He testified he did not
pursue the matter further in his first contact with [W] once she said she had
not been contacted by an officer. Lt.
Wolfe called [W] on May 19. [W]
confirmed that she could not identify the driver, but said she could identify
the passenger. Lt. Wolfe
testified Grievant's report was accurate in reporting [W] could not identify
the driver. However, his concern
was that Grievant did not know the information was accurate when he wrote
it. Sheriff Ray Steele testified
the report was true only in the sense that afterward Grievant learned that
information. Sheriff
Steele testified the Director of Dispatch, Brenda Hostetler, checked all
systems, as well as with the staff on duty on May 11.
Hostetler reportedly learned no one had passed on the information from
[W's] second call to Grievant, and disciplined two staff members for this
omission. Lt. Wolfe testified he reviewed one or two hours of phone
logs and radio transmissions for the evening of May 11. He found no dispatch to Grievant that evening advising him
[W] could not identify the driver. Dilts
could not determine from the tapes whether Dispatch gave the information from
[W's] second call to Grievant. She
testified it was impractical to scan for telephone calls because the scanning
system failed to stop for some calls. The
only way to check calls would have been to listen to each phone line straight
through. Grievant
testified he did not attempt to contact [W] on May 11 because he was assisting
Deputy Krauger in completing a large number of reports.
He believed he attempted unsuccessfully to contact [W] on May 12.
He did the rest of the follow-up on the complaint on May 12, by running
the vehicle license plates and contacting the owner's home.
He testified he wrote the narrative portion of his report all at once.
He did not recall how he learned [W] could not identify the driver, but
believed it was from someone at Dispatch.
He had no recollection of having that information dispatched out.
However, he calls Dispatch at times, and also has social contact with
one of the dispatchers, Sue Martin. He
recalled encountering Martin at the Department gas pumps on May 12 and
talking to her then about the Black Rock incident.
He did not recall whether they also discussed the reckless driving
incident that day. Grievant
testified he told Sheriff Steele he may have talked to Martin.
However, he had already learned she also did not recall whether they
had discussed the reckless driving incident, although she did recall talking
to him at the time. He therefore
did not pursue using her as a witness. Grievant's
Interview Lt.
Wolfe met with Grievant and his Association representative for a recorded
interview on May 19. Grievant signed a document informing him the inquiry
pertained to "prompt response to calls for service." At the outset of the interview, Grievant's representative
asked for the case number involved; Lt. Wolfe provided only the case number
for the Black Rock incident. Lt.
Wolfe inquired into the Black Rock incident, then turned to the reckless
driving incident, then returned to the Black Rock incident. The
tape recording of the interview was introduced in evidence.
Except for the opening remarks, no transcript was made of the tape;
however, the Arbitrator has reviewed the tape thoroughly. When
first asked about the reckless driving incident, Grievant commented "This
was a phone call that I, uh, made to the complainant--or, I attempted to make
to the complainant...." From
that point on, he repeatedly said he was unable to reach [W].
At several points, he said he could not attempt to telephone [W] at the
time the call was dispatched to him, because he had no cell phone with him
that day. In
the interview, Grievant repeatedly described having called [AL's] number and
talked to [PL], although he did not recall when he made this call.
He was certain he had called [PL] from the office, because he had no
cell phone. Department telephone
records confirm that he called [PL's] residence on the evening of May 12 from
the office. During
the interview, Grievant said Dispatch did not have everything on the CAD,
but that [W] had later called in and said she could not identify the driver.
He said he had called Dispatch to report he had attempted to contact
[W], but there was no answer; he said he was told she could not identify the
driver. On further inquiry, he
was unable to recall when or how Dispatch gave him this information, but
repeatedly commented Dispatch was the only way he could have gotten it. Lt. Wolfe informed him the telephone and radio tapes showed
Dispatch never gave him that information. Grievant
eventually conceded he did not know where he got the information that [W]
could not identify the driver. He
also conceded he was unsure whether that information was "the
truth," since he could not recall how he got it, but that he thought he
had that information. When
challenged to say with certainty whether the information was
"accurate" or not, he said he would have to say no, and acknowledged
the information he wrote could be false.
When Lt. Wolfe suggested the report that [W] could not identify the
driver was inaccurate "because you don't know that for a fact,"
Grievant agreed. Lt.
Wolfe's recollection of the interview varied somewhat from the tape.
For example, he testified Grievant initially claimed he had called [W],
and only later said he might have gotten the information from Dispatch. He also testified that, after being told the tapes showed the
information did not come from Dispatch, Grievant claimed to have called [W],
and at a later point said he could not recall how he talked to her.
He also testified that Grievant claimed [W] told him she could not
identify the driver. Except for
the comment quoted above, which he corrected immediately, at no point on the
tape did Grievant claim to have talked to [W]; he at no point indicated [W]
had told him anything. Other
Information Sgt.
D. W. Dunkin provided a report to Lt. Wolfe regarding his follow-up of [W's]
report. The report includes the
fact that [W] was unable to identify the driver because of the tinted windows.
Although the report notes the passenger was making obscene gestures
to [W], it does not include a physical description or other identifying
information regarding the passenger. POSITION OF COUNTY The
Arbitrator should reject Grievant's claim that he may have received the
information about [W] from an off-duty dispatcher.
Grievant did not offer this purported excuse at any earlier stage in
the grievance procedure. The
alleged lack of notice of the scope of Lt. Wolfe's questions is not a valid
defense. Grievant was told the
inquiry pertained to "prompt response to calls for service."
He had union representation at the interview and had an opportunity to
take a break and consult with his representative.
Finally, no contract provision requires 24 hours' notice. Grievant
was untruthful. He did not contact [W], nor did he contact Dispatch.
He therefore had no basis in fact to say [W] could not identify the
driver. Had he contacted [W] or
Dispatch, he would have learned that [W] could identify the passenger, and
this information would have appeared on the report.
The discipline should be upheld.
POSITION OF THE ASSOCIATION The
County failed to establish that Grievant was untruthful.
It also failed to establish that the discipline was based on just cause
and progressive discipline principles. The
County's inability to establish that Grievant was untruthful moots the issue
of whether the suspension was based on just cause and progressive
discipline. Grievant should be
exonerated of any charge of untruthfulness, and the suspension should be
rescinded with all back pay and benefits restored. Without
question, the County may discipline employees for being untruthful.
Employees are on notice of this.
However, Grievant had no notice he had to be able to substantiate, with
physical proof, a statement in a report that by all accounts was true.
Grievant's inability to recall where he learned that information is not
a basis for discipline. Grievant's
reliance on hearsay is a common practice in law enforcement, the legal and
judicial system, and daily life. No
nexus exists with the supposed "rule," since the County is unable to
specify how Grievant was untruthful. Grievant's
writing of the truthful statement has not been shown to have impaired the
orderly, efficient and safe operation of the Sheriff's Office.
The follow-up and written information was exactly what the Sheriff's
Office properly would expect of Grievant. Lt.
Wolfe did not conduct a full investigation.
Grievant had not yet completed following up on the report when Lt.
Wolfe began his investigation. The County failed to fully investigate how Grievant learned
the truthful statement. Although
the statement was true, Lt. Wolfe concluded it was untruthful simply because
Grievant could not recall how he learned the information.
The County's failure to locate Dispatch records of transmitting this
information to Grievant does not establish that the statement was untruthful.
The County reviewed only communication records from May 11. [W] made a second phone call to Dispatch on May 11.
The number of telephone lines and radio frequencies at Dispatch made it
impossible for any one person to review all communications for either May 11
or May 12. The County did not
contact all dispatch employees to determine whether any of them gave the information
to Grievant. The
County did not conduct a fair and impartial investigation.
Lt. Wolfe acted as both the prosecutor and judge, as well as the main
witness against Grievant. Lt.
Wolfe focused Grievant's attention on the "Black Rock" incident,
then sneakily inquired into [W's] report.
Grievant was not concentrating on nor prepared to answer questions
about [W's] report. Lt. Wolfe was
emotionally involved in backing up his decision.
Upper management acted on a "My supervisor, right or wrong"
basis. The
County did not obtain substantial proof that Grievant was untruthful.
Grievant's statement was true. Lt.
Wolfe had difficulty recalling how or when he learned information about the
incident from [W]. His testimony
exhibited the same failing for which he disciplined Grievant.
Even with his file before him, he could not recall where or when he
first saw Grievant's report and when he first spoke with [W].
By the County's standards, if Grievant's statement was untruthful, Lt.
Wolfe's testimony must also be untruthful.
The County attempted to bolster its case at the arbitration hearing
with information and events not previously used against Grievant.
It failed to prove that Grievant's statement was untrue. The
County has not consistently disciplined employees for conduct similar to
Grievant's. Other deputies have
had similar activity and CAD reports. Assuming arguendo that the County proved the misconduct charged, the County failed to follow the principles of progressive discipline. The alleged offense was not serious. According to Wolfe, the statement was true, but Grievant could not have known it was true. The offense was minor and absurd. Neither Lt. Wolfe nor Sheriff Steele would acknowledge that the disputed statement was true. Since the statement was true, there is no need to examine Grievant's history. The punishment does not fit the alleged crime, because there was no crime. It is ludicrous to claim that Grievant guessed at the statement and was therefore untruthful. This subjected Grievant to arbitrary and capricious discipline. The
County engaged in a blatant and gross violation of the basic principles and
theories of just cause and progressive discipline.
The lack of notice, full investigation, fairness, and proof of guilt
are clear throughout the case. As
a remedy, Grievant should be exonerated, the grievance sustained, all discipline
or reference to this grievance should be rescinded, and Grievant should be
made whole for all pay and benefits for the period of the suspension.
The lack of adequate and contractual due process alone necessitates
sustaining the grievance and reinstatement.
OPINION As
the parties recognize, the County bears the burden of showing just cause for
this suspension. In determining
whether the County has met this burden, the County is bound by the charges
upon which it acted at the time. The County has specifically disavowed any reliance on the
sufficiency or completeness of the investigation itself as a basis for
discipline. Instead, it relies
solely on the charge that Grievant's written report was untruthful. The
charge of untruthfulness includes an element of intent--that is, that Grievant
included information which he knew to be false or acted out of reckless
disregard for the truth. Thus, to sustain its burden, the County must show, by clear
and convincing evidence, (1) that one or more aspects of Grievant's report
were false and (2) that Grievant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the
falsity. Grievant's
report accurately stated that [W] could not identify the driver.
[W] repeated that information to Lt. Wolfe, and the information also
appears in Sgt. Dunkin's report. While
Grievant's report did not go on to say that [W] could describe the passenger,
that is a matter of completeness, not truthfulness.
In any event, it is unclear on this record whether that additional
information came in [W's] second phone call to Dispatch, or only in her later
contacts with Lt. Wolfe. No dispute
exists that the remainder of Grievant's report accurately described his contact
with [PL]. Thus, Grievant's written
report was, in fact, truthful. The
concern over his inability to substantiate the source of some the information
goes to the adequacy of his documentation of the investigation, not the
truthfulness of his report. Indeed,
having concluded that the report was truthful, the source of that information is
irrelevant for purposes of this proceeding. Accordingly,
on this record, the County has not shown that Grievant's report was untruthful
in any respect. It is therefore concluded that the suspension was not for
just cause. This conclusion makes
it unnecessary to determine whether, if cause for discipline had been shown, the
suspension would have been consistent with progressive discipline.
Absent a showing of just cause, no discipline was warranted. The parties stipulated that, in the event the Union prevailed on the merits, the Arbitrator would retain jurisdiction over the remedy and any disputes arising therefrom. The remedy aspect of this matter is therefore remanded to the parties for resolution. The Arbitrator will retain jurisdiction in the event the parties are unable to agree on an appropriate remedy.
AWARD The imposition of discipline was not for just cause. The remedial aspect of this matter is remanded to the parties for resolution. The Arbitrator retains jurisdiction over any disputes regarding the appropriate remedy. DATED:
May 29, 1996
LUELLA E. NELSON -
Arbitrator
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