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Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes
(10-277)
1.5 million member class
cannot be certified
Decided June 20, 2011
[Opinion full text]
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Current and
former Wal-Mart employees sought judgment against the company for injunctive and
declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay, on behalf of themselves and a
nationwide class of some 1.5 million female employees, because of Wal-Mart's
alleged discrimination against women in violation of Title VII. They claim that
local managers exercise their discretion over pay and promotions
disproportionately in favor of men, which has an unlawful disparate impact on
female employees; and that Wal-Mart's refusal to cabin its managers' authority
amounts to disparate treatment. The District Court certified the class, finding
that respondents satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), and Rule
23(b)(2)'s requirement of showing that "the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole." The Ninth Circuit substantially affirmed.
The
US Supreme Court reversed, finding that (1) certification of the class was not
consistent with Rule 23(a), and (2) the backpay claims were improperly certified
under Rule 23(b)(2). (1) Under Rule 23(a), plaintiffs cannot
prove "common questions of law or fact." Plaintiffs wish to sue for
millions of employment decisions at once, but there was no "significant
proof that an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination."
Wal-Mart's announced policy forbids discrimination and has penalties for
violations. Plaintiffs' only evidence of a general discrimination policy was a
sociologist's analysis asserting that Wal-Mart's corporate culture made it
vulnerable to gender bias, but he could not estimate what percent of the
decisions might be determined by stereotypical thinking. Wal-Mart's policy gives
local managers discretion, but it is
unlikely that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way
without some common direction. Plaintiffs' attempt to show such direction by
means of statistical and anecdotal evidence fell short. (2) Under Rule 23(b)(2), the backpay
claims were improperly certified. Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single,
indivisible remedy would provide relief to each class member. Individualized
monetary claims belong instead in Rule 23(b)(3), with its procedural protections
of predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out.
Plaintiffs' argument that backpay claims do not "predominate" over
their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief is rejected because such an
interpretation has no basis in the Rule's text and does violence to the Rule's
structural features. Four
Justices partially DISSENTED as to the Rule 23(a) issue, arguing that the
majority "imports into the
Rule 23(a) determination concerns properly addressed in a Rule 23(b)(3)
assessment."
Case below: Dukes v.
Wal-Mart Stores (9th Cir 04/26/2010)
Question presented in petition for certiorari:
In
a sharply divided 6-5 decision that conflicts with many decisions of this Court
and other circuits, the en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed the certification of the
largest employment class action in history. This nationwide class includes
every woman employed for any period of time over the past decade, in any of
Wal-Mart’s approximately 3,400 separately managed stores, 41 regions, and 400
districts, and who held positions in any of approximately 53 departments and
170 different job classifications. The millions of class members collectively
seek billions of dollars in monetary relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, claiming that tens of thousands of Wal-Mart managers inflicted
monetary injury on each and every individual class member in the same manner by
intentionally discriminating against them because of their sex, in violation of
the company’s express anti-discrimination policy. The
questions presented are: I.
Whether claims for monetary relief can be certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2)—which by its terms is limited to injunctive or
corresponding declaratory relief—and, if so, under what circumstances.
Additional question ordered by the Supreme
Court:
Whether the class certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a).
Briefs on the merits:
Certiorari Documents:
Counsel:
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