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United States Supreme Court Employment Law Cases
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Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc. (06-989)
Federal Arbitration Act: Contract cannot expand scope of judicial review
Decided March 25, 2008 [Full
text of opinion]
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In a nutshell: When a party seeks to vacate
an arbitration award by using the Federal Arbitration Act's procedure for
expedited judicial review, the Federal Arbitration Act's grounds for vacating an
award are exclusive, and federal courts cannot enforce a contractual expansion
of those grounds.
Official Syllabus:
The
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §§9-11, provides expedited judicial
review to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards. Under §9, a court
"must" confirm an award "unless" it is vacated, modified, or
corrected "as prescribed" in §§10 and 11. Section 10 lists grounds
for vacating an award, including where the award was procured by
"corruption," "fraud," or "undue means," and where
the arbitrators were "guilty of misconduct," or "exceeded their
powers." Under §11, the grounds for modifying or correcting an award
include "evident material miscalculation," "evident material
mistake," and "imperfect[ions] in [a] matter of form not affecting the
merits."
After a bench trial sustained respondent tenant's (Mattel) right to
terminate its lease with petitioner landlord (Hall Street), the parties proposed
to arbitrate Hall Street's claim for indemnification of the costs of cleaning up
the lease site. The District Court approved, and entered as an order, the
parties' arbitration agreement, which, inter alia, required the court to vacate,
modify, or correct any award if the arbitrator's conclusions of law were
erroneous. The arbitrator decided for Mattel, but the District Court vacated the
award for legal error, expressly invoking the agreement's legal-error review
standard and citing the Ninth Circuit's LaPine decision for the proposition that
the FAA allows parties to draft a contract dictating an alternative review
standard. On remand, the arbitrator ruled for Hall Street, and the District
Court largely upheld the award, again applying the parties' stipulated review
standard. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the case controlled by its Kyocera
decision, which had overruled LaPine on the ground that arbitration-agreement
terms fixing the mode of judicial review are unenforceable, given the exclusive
grounds for vacatur and modification provided by FAA §§10 and 11.
Held:
1. The FAA's grounds for prompt vacatur and modification of awards are
exclusive for parties seeking expedited review under the FAA. The Court rejects
Hall Street's two arguments to the contrary. First, Hall Street submits that
expandable judicial review has been accepted as the law since Wilko v. Swan, 346
U. S. 427 . Although a Wilko statement-"the interpretations of the law by
the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation," id., at
436-437 (emphasis added)-arguably favors Hall Street's position, arguable is as
far as it goes. Quite apart from the leap from a supposed judicial expansion by
interpretation to a private expansion by contract, Hall Street overlooks the
fact that the Wilko statement expressly rejects just what Hall Street asks for
here, general review for an arbitrator's legal errors. Moreover, Wilko's
phrasing is too vague to support Hall Street's interpretation, since
"manifest disregard" can be read as merely referring to the §10
grounds collectively, rather than adding to them, see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614 , or as shorthand for the
§10 subsections authorizing vacatur when arbitrators were "guilty of
misconduct" or "exceeded their powers." Second, Hall Street says
that the agreement to review for legal error ought to prevail simply because
arbitration is a creature of contract, and the FAA is motivated by a
congressional desire to enforce such agreements. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U. S. 213 . This argument comes up short because, although there may
be a general policy favoring arbitration, the FAA has textual features at odds
with enforcing a contract to expand judicial review once the arbitration is
over. Even assuming §§10 and 11 could be supplemented to some extent, it would
stretch basic interpretive principles to expand their uniformly narrow stated
grounds to the point of legal review generally. But §9 makes evident that
expanding §10's and §11's detailed categories at all would rub too much
against the grain: §9 carries no hint of flexibility in unequivocally telling
courts that they "must" confirm an arbitral award, "unless"
it is vacated or modified "as prescribed" by §§10 and 11. Instead of
fighting the text, it makes more sense to see §§9-11 as the substance of a
national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to
maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Dean
Witter, supra, at 217, 219, distinguished.
2. In holding the §10 and §11 grounds exclusive with regard to
enforcement under the FAA's expedited judicial review mechanisms, this Court
decides nothing about other possible avenues for judicial enforcement of awards.
Accordingly, this case must be remanded for consideration of independent issues.
Because the arbitration agreement was entered into during litigation, was
submitted to the District Court as a request to deviate from the standard
sequence of litigation procedure, and was adopted by the court as an order,
there is some question whether it should be treated as an exercise of the
District Court's authority to manage its cases under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16. This Court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue, but the
parties' supplemental arguments implicate issues that have not been considered
previously in this litigation and could not be well addressed for the first time
here. Thus, the Court expresses no opinion on these matters beyond leaving them
open for Hall Street to press on remand. 196
Fed. Appx. 476, vacated and remanded.
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and THOMAS, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined as
to all but footnote 7. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
KENNEDY, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Case below: Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 196 Fed. Appx. 476 (9th Cir 08/01/2006) (not published) Majority
opinion | Dissent
Question presented by petition for certiorari:
Did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals err
when it held, in conflict with several other Courts of Appeal, that the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA") precludes a federal court from enforcing the
parties' clearly expressed agreement providing for more expansive judicial
review of an arbitration award than the narrow standard of review otherwise
provided for in the FAA?
Question presented in Respondent's brief:
Whether the parties to an arbitration agreement that provides
that a court may confirm the award as a judgment can further empower that court
to vacate or modify the award on grounds of legal or factual error, despite the
Federal Arbitration Act’s mandate that a court “must grant an order” confirming
an award except on certain specified grounds that do not include legal or
factual error. The US Supreme Court on November 16
ordered supplemental briefing on the following
issues: (2) If such authority does exist, did the parties, in agreeing to
arbitrate, rely in whole or part on that authority? (3) Has petitioner in the course of this litigation waived any reliance
on authority outside the FAA for enforcing the judicial review provision of
the parties’ arbitration agreement?
Certiorari Documents:
Briefs on the merits:
Other sources:
Counsel:
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