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Featured Cases ***
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Capsules ***
Moore
v. Freeman (6th Cir 01/13/2004)
http://laws.findlaw.com/6th/04a0014p.html
Moore
sued his employer asserting, among other things, a retaliation
claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Moore
after a jury verdict in his favor.
In particular, the jury awarded Moore compensatory
damages for emotional distress.
The trial court let the emotional distress award stand,
concluding that such damages were available for FLSA
retaliation claims. The
6th Circuit affirmed (but vacated the attorney fee award for
recalculation by the trial court).
29
USC Section 216(b) addresses damages for FLSA retaliation
claims. That
provision states that employers "shall be liable for such
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate ... including
without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and
the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages." The 7th Circuit, the only other circuit to directly address
the question of whether Section 216(b) allows emotional
distress damages, has concluded that such damages are
available under that section.
The 8th and 9th Circuits have allowed Section 216(b)
emotional distress damages awards to stand without directly
addressing the issue. Consistent
with these decisions, the court concluded that emotional
distress damages are available under Section 216(b).
The court reasoned that "[t]he statutory scheme
contemplates compensation in full for any retaliation
employees suffer from reporting grievances, and there is no
indication that it would not include compensation for
demonstrable emotional injuries, as well as economic
ones."
Wagner
v. Professional Engineers in California Government (9th Cir
01/14/2004)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0216397p.pdf
A
union may charge nonunion members of bargaining units fees to
pay for their "fair share" of the union's cost of
negotiating and administering a collective bargaining
agreement. These
fees are typically referred to as "fair share" or
"agency" fees.
Under the 1st Amendment, however, such nonmembers have
a right to decide whether to pay for political and expressive
activities that are unrelated to collective bargaining.
The expenditures that a union may not charge if a
nonmember objects are called "nonchargeable"
expenditures.
To
help facilitate nonmembers' 1st Amendment rights, unions must
provide "an adequate explanation of the basis for the
[fair share] fee." This
"adequate explanation" is referred to as a
"Hudson notice" (named for Chicago Teachers Union,
Local No. 1. v. Hudson, 475 US 292 (1986)).
In a Hudson notice, each major category of expenditures
is classified as chargeable or nonchargeable.
The court held that the proper remedy for a union's
issuance of a defective Hudson notice is issuance of a new
Hudson notice, with a renewed opportunity for nonmembers to
object to paying for nonchargeable expenditures. An inadequate Hudson notice gives nonmembers insufficient
information with which to decide whether or not to object to
paying the portion of their fees attributable to nonchargeable
expenditures. The
court reasoned that such a remedy addresses that harm.
McMullen
v. Meijer, Inc. (6th Cir 01/14/2004)
http://laws.findlaw.com/6th/04a0015a.html
McMullen sought a
declaratory judgment that her Title VII claims weren't subject
to the mandatory arbitration agreement she signed at inception
of employment. Under
the agreement, the arbitrator was to be selected from a list
compiled solely by the employer.
McMullen argued that the employer's unilateral control
over the pool of potential arbitrators rendered the agreement
unenforceable with respect to her Title VII claims.
The court agreed that the agreement was unenforceable
as to the arbitrator selection provision, but remanded for
consideration of whether that provision was severable from the
remainder of the agreement.
Calero-Cerezo
v. United States Department of Justice (1st Cir 01/14/2004)
http://laws.findlaw.com/1st/022643.html
Calero-Cerezo,
a federal employee, sued the employer asserting claims for
"failure to reasonably accommodate" under the
Rehabilitation Act and retaliation under Title VII.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
the employer on both claims. The 1st Circuit reversed, concluding that 1) Calero-Cerezo
provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on
her Rehabilitation Act claim; and 2) Calero-Cerezo provided
sufficient evidence of a "causal link" to survive
summary judgment on her Title VII claim.
The court noted that reversal was necessitated in part
by the fact that the employer's counsel "entirely failed
to address either the facts or the law" supporting its
position on appeal.
Joens
v. John Morrell & Co. (8th Cir 01/14/2004)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/8th/031573p.pdf
Joens
sued the employer asserting, among other things, a claim for
Title VII sexual harassment.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the employer. The
8th Circuit affirmed. The
court found that the alleged harasser was a co-worker, not a
supervisor, for purposes of the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in Faragher and Ellerth.
The court also determined that the conduct at issue was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive, and that Joens provided
insufficient evidence that the harassing behavior was
"because of" sex.
Mason
v. Avaya Communications (10th Cir 01/13/2004)
http://laws.findlaw.com/10th/036035.html
Mason
sued the employer under the ADA, claiming that the employer
failed to reasonably accommodate her disability (post
traumatic stress disorder) when it refused to allow her to
work from home. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer,
and the 10th Circuit affirmed.
The court concluded that 1) attendance at work was an
essential job function; and 2) her request to work at home was
not reasonable.
Harris
v. F.A.A. (DC Cir 01/13/2004)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/dc/025304a.pdf
Air
traffic controllers were fired in 1981 for participating in an
illegal strike. The
ban on the rehiring of these federal employees was lifted in
1993 and they were rehired. The employees sued the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
claiming that its decision to rehire them all at the GS-9 pay
grade level violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The trial court dismissed the suit as untimely, and the DC
Circuit affirmed. The
court concluded that the FAA recruitment notice alerting the
employees that they were eligible for rehire at the GS-9 pay
grade level was a "final agency action" that
triggered the applicable six-year limitations period.
Silver
v. CPC-Sherwood Manor (Okalahoma 01/13/2004)
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=438274
Silver
was employed as a cook. After
arriving at work one day, he became violently ill (diarrhea
and vomiting). His employer fired him for leaving work, and he sued claiming
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a
claim. The court
reversed, concluding that Silver stated a claim based on the
public policy underlying article 11, part A of the Public
Health Code.
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