| Free Trial / Sign Up | Products / Prices / Samples | About Us / Contact | FAQs | Home |
|
Latest employment law cases Summaries and links to full text |
|
Emailed directly to you and online all the time |
| Latest Cases | Advanced Search | Law Firm Directory | Arbitrator Directory | Law School Directory | Legal Resources / Memos |
| Employment Law Memo |
| Arbitration Law Memo |
| NLRB Law Memo |
| Employment Low Blog |
| Arbitration Law Blog |
| Employment Law 101 |
| Articles |
| Supreme Court Cases |
| EEOC Info |
| NLRB Info |
|
NLRB - National Labor Relations Board |
|
NLRB General Counsel Report on Recent Case Developments FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE R-2525 NLRB
GENERAL COUNSEL ARTHUR ROSENFELD National Labor Relations Board General Counsel Arthur F. Rosenfeld today issued a report on casehandling developments in the Office of the General Counsel. The report covers selected cases of interest that were decided during the period from July 2003 through December 2003. It discusses cases that were decided upon a request for advice from a Regional Director or on appeal from a Regional Director’s dismissal of unfair labor practice charges. In addition, it summarizes cases in which the General Counsel sought and obtained Board authorization to institute injunction proceedings under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. General Counsel Rosenfeld is beginning with this report a practice of discussing some of the ethical issues in the administration of the Act. The issues discussed in the report relate to state bar applications of ABA Model Rule 4.2 (communications with represented persons) to Agency investigations. (The
General Counsel’s report can be accessed in the press releases area of the
NLRB web site: www.nlrb.gov or copies can
be obtained by contacting the Division of Information at 202-273-1991.) #
# # REPORT
OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
This report covers selected cases of interest that were decided during
the period from July through December 2003.
It discusses cases which were decided upon a request for advice from a
Regional Director or on appeal from a Regional Director's dismissal of unfair
labor practice charges. In
addition, it summarizes cases in which the General Counsel sought and obtained
Board authorization to institute injunction proceedings under Section 10(j) of
the Act.
With
this Report, I am beginning a practice of reporting on some of the ethical
issues that confront us in the administration of the Act. We have discussed these at various conferences with the Bar and have
received a number of requests for more information about what we are doing.
The issues discussed in the Report relate to state bar applications of
ABA Model Rule 4.2 (communications with represented persons) to Agency
investigations. ________________________ EMPLOYER
REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH Employer Obligation to Provide Union with Relevant Medical Information after Enactment of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
In several cases, we examined the impact of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(1996)) and its regulations against disclosure of health-related information
(the Privacy Rule, 45 CFR §§ 160 & 164 (2002)) on employers’ duty to
provide unions with requested relevant medical information.
We decided that the promulgation of the HIPAA regulations did not
terminate an employer’s obligation to bargain over an accommodation of its
confidentiality interest in health information concerning unit employees.
We reached that conclusion because HIPAA does not absolutely prohibit
the disclosure of such information, and because the HIPAA regulations’
exceptions for providing redacted medical information and for allowing
patients to consent to disclosure are consistent with Board accommodations for
providing confidential information.
Case One
The employer operated an on-site medical facility at its plant, which
maintained employee medical records and was staffed by a nurse.
The union representing 1700 employees requested documents relating to
the administration of workers’ compensation claims, the provision of health
care at the on-site medical facility, workplace injuries and illnesses,
including injury reports required by OSHA (Form 301 equivalents), internal
employer injury reports, and medical records.
Relying on HIPPA regulations, the employer stated that it would supply
the information only upon employee consent.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits "covered entities" (such as
the Employer here) from misusing and sharing individually identifiable
"protected health information" (PHI), relating "to the past,
present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual
[or] the provision of health care" (45 CFR § 160.103).
In certain situations, however, a covered entity may disclose PHI
without violating HIPAA. For
example, the Privacy Rule permits a covered entity to disclose PHI upon
receiving an individual’s consent authorization, or even without the
individual’s authorization by redacting information from PHI that may be
used to identify the individual, a process that the Privacy Rule refers to as
"de-identification" (id. at § 164.514(a)-(c)).
Under Section 164.512(a)(1) of the Privacy Rule, a covered entity may
also use or disclose PHI without an individual’s written authorization where
the use or disclosure is required by law. We
concluded that the employer unlawfully refused to seek an accommodation
through bargaining with the union over providing confidential information by
insisting on employee consent because the option of redaction, proposed by the
union, appeared to effectively accommodate the competing interests.
We concluded that HIPAA did not alter the employer’s duty to bargain
over accommodations such as consent or "de-identification" of
confidential medical records because HIPAA’s exceptions to nondisclosure of
PHI parallel confidentiality accommodations that have been approved or
fashioned by the Board. See,
e.g., LaGuardia Hospital, 260 NLRB 1455, 1463 (1982); Johns Manville
Sales, 252 NLRB 368 (1980). We
also decided that portions of the OSHA-required injury report forms may not
have even been HIPAA-covered PHI because they did not appear to be used or
obtained in the employer’s capacity as a covered entity.
Rather, because OSHA regulations required the employer to complete and
maintain the reports when a work-related injury or illness occurs, the reports
would be "employee records held by a covered entity in its role as
employer," which HIPAA expressly excludes from the definition of PHI.
See 45 CFR § 164.504(f); see also 67 Fed. Reg. 53182, 53192 (2002).
Further, even though the reports may have been held in employee medical
files, HIPAA’s "required by law" exception to the prohibition
against disclosure of PHI would allow the employer to furnish those redacted
portions of the document that OSHA regulations require be provided to an
employee’s collective-bargaining representative, 29 CFR § 1904.35(b)(v)(B).
As such, the employee would have no reasonable expectation of privacy
in those portions of the injury reports. Case
Two An
employer stated that it would no longer provide certain medical information to
the union without employee consent because "HIPAA has taken effect."
In this case, the Union requested access to forms listing employees’
physical capacities upon their returns to work from workers’ compensation or
sickness/accident leave.
We initially decided that the employer, which manufactures
hydrocarbon resins, was not a
"covered entity" under HIPAA, despite its assertion that it was
because it sponsored its own employee health benefits plan.
We also decided that the physical restriction forms were held by the
employer in its role as an employer, and the forms were therefore not PHI.
Further, we found no reasonable employee expectation of
confidentiality, since the employer had always previously provided the forms
to the union without seeking employee consent.
Accordingly, we authorized complaint alleging that the employer
unlawfully refused to provide the forms unconditionally. General
Counsel to Argue that Board Adopt Limitation to "Perfectly
Clear" Successorship In
another case, we decided that an employer was a "perfectly clear"
successor under NLRB v. Burns Int’l Security Services, 406 U.S. 272
(1972) and Canteen Co., 317 NLRB 1052, 1057 (1995), enfd. 103 F.3d 1355
(7th Cir. 1997), and therefore that it was not privileged to
exercise a successor’s usual privilege to unilaterally set initial terms and
conditions of employment. However,
we further decided to argue to the Board that it should limit the
"perfectly clear" exception to situations where employees have been
extended actual unconditional offers of hire by the successor, with no
indication that the predecessor’s terms would be changed, in agreement with
the dissent’s view in Canteen, 317 NLRB at 1057 (Members Stephens and
Cohen dissenting).
In this matter, the union had represented employees at a facility of
the predecessor which was then sold to the successor.
Prior to holding a meeting with the predecessor’s employees and
before the purchase became effective, the successor’s president had a short
conversation with a union representative, during which the union
representative asked what would happen to the unit employees after the
purchase. The successor’s
president responded that "[w]e are going to hire all the employees."
Shortly after that conversation, the union representative told the unit
employees that the successor intended to retain them.
Later that afternoon, the successor held a meeting with the unit
employees during which it described its hiring process and told the employees
that their health and dental insurance would change to the successor’s
plans. When asked about wage
rates and vacation amounts, the successor stated that it could not tell
employees their specific wage rates or vacation amounts until the interview
process. The successor then
opened with a majority of its unit employees having been employed in the
predecessor’s unit represented by the union.
The employees were employed at different wages and with different
vacation benefits. We
authorized complaint alleging that the successor employer was a
"perfectly clear" successor, without the freedom to unilaterally set
initial terms and conditions, because it initially informed the union of its
plan to retain the predecessor employees without clarifying that employees
would be working under different terms and conditions.
The Board limits the "perfectly clear" exception to
circumstances in which the new employer actively or implicitly misleads
employees, directly or through their bargaining representative, into believing
that they will be retained by the successor under the same terms and
conditions, or fails to clearly state its intent to establish new terms and
conditions before inviting predecessor employees to accept employment.
In Canteen, for instance, the Board majority imposed a
bargaining obligation under the "perfectly clear" exception because
of the successor's silence regarding new wage rates when it initially
announced to the union its intent to hire the predecessor's employees.
Although the successor in Canteen told the union that it wanted
employees to serve a probationary period and told the employees that it wanted
them to apply for employment, it failed to mention in either discussion the
possibility of other changes in initial terms and conditions.
The successor first mentioned its reduced wage rate to employees one
day after it had communicated to the union its plan to retain the predecessor
employees. The Board found that
the successor thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5). While
the successor in the case under consideration would be a "perfectly
clear" successor under the majority holding in Canteen, we decided
that we would also argue to the Board that it adopt the view of the dissent in
Canteen to limit the "perfectly clear" exception to
situations where employees have been extended actual unconditional offers of
hire by the successor prior to any indication being given that the
predecessor’s terms would be changed. Such
a holding would protect employees from being misled into accepting
employment with a successor under the belief that their terms and
conditions would not change. 317
NLRB at 1056 (emphasis in the original). Employer Unlawfully Insisted on Negotiating Contract by Videoconferencing
In
our next case, we decided that the use of a videoconference system to
negotiate an initial collective-bargaining agreement with the Union is not
comparable to face-to-face bargaining. As
a result, the Employer's insistence on conducting negotiations in that manner
violated the Act's requirement that it meet and confer in good faith with the
Union.
After certification as the 9(a) representative of the employees, the
Union requested bargaining for an initial contract.
The Employer insisted that such bargaining be conducted via its
videoconference system – i.e., the Employer's negotiating team in Florida
would bargain with the Union's negotiating team, seated in the Employer's
Portland, Oregon office, by way of a secure video link.
The Union objected to that demand, proposing instead that the parties
meet in person at either the Union's office, the Employer's Portland office,
or a mutually agreed upon neutral site. The
Union ultimately canceled the first session because the parties were unable to
resolve this issue, and no bargaining had taken place.
The Employer asserted that negotiating by videoconference should
satisfy the Board's "face-to-face" bargaining requirement, and
further defended its position on the grounds that it widely utilized
videoconferencing to train employees, to hold daily management briefings, and
to conduct meetings with employees and vendors.
The Employer also asserted that videoconference bargaining would be
more cost effective and less time consuming than meeting in person, and would
ultimately lead to more productive bargaining sessions.
On the other hand, the Union contended that videoconference negotiating
was akin to bargaining by telephone, which the Board has held does not satisfy
the face-to-face bargaining requirement.
The Union further asserted that videoconference bargaining would not
allow for a complete give-and-take of ideas and proposals or permit the
parties to gain a "feel" for the other side.
The Union was apprehensive about the fact that the videoconference
system would allow only one person at a time to speak and would not permit the
parties to see everyone on the other side's team.
The Union was also concerned that the Employer would record bargaining
sessions, as it had initially suggested, and that this possibility would
engender reticence and distrust.
Although the Board, with court approval, has consistently interpreted
Section 8(d) to require that parties negotiate face-to-face, and has
determined that insisting on negotiating by telephone or mail is unlawful, it
has never articulated its rationale for that determination.
However, we decided that absent agreement, sound policies require
in-person collective-bargaining negotiations, which necessarily involve the
communication of difficult messages and the existence of strong differences of
opinion.
First, we were concerned that videoconference bargaining, over the
objections of one of the parties, would not permit parties to
contemporaneously exchange draft language or written proposals (which in many
instances are prepared or revised spontaneously during the course of a
bargaining session), sign-off on tentatively agreed-upon terms in the midst of
bargaining, or hold sidebar conferences with members of the other side's
negotiating committee. We were
further concerned that videoconference bargaining would not permit the parties
to observe nuances of eye contact and body language, both on the part of the
individual speaking and on the part of those observing.
In addition, the Union's apprehensions about speaking candidly when it
could not be certain as to who was in the room and as to whether the sessions
were being recorded were not unreasonable.
These concerns were particularly germane where a newly certified Union
was seeking to negotiate its first contract with the Employer, and the parties
consequently had no history to guide them and had not yet established a
relationship of trust. Finally,
we noted that although the Employer argued that it used videoconferencing for
a wide range of business activities, none of the other uses the Employer made
of its system -- i.e., training employees and conducting meetings with
management, employees, and vendors -- involved dynamics comparable to those
involved in collective-bargaining. Bargaining to Impasse over Interim Health Insurance Coverage In
another case, we decided that an employer that was bargaining for an initial
collective-bargaining agreement lawfully insisted on separate bargaining over
interim health insurance coverage, but then unlawfully implemented its interim
health insurance proposal before reaching a bona fide impasse. The Employer had always provided its employees with a health insurance benefit. Every year, the Employer had solicited bids, under certain criteria, from various health insurance providers. After reviewing the bids, the Employer offered employees a choice of providers and plans for the following year.
The Union was certified in December 2001 and the parties began
bargaining for an initial agreement. In
August 2002, during this bargaining, the Employer learned that one of its
existing health insurance providers would not offer its current plan after
December 31. Since the Employer
could not maintain the status quo during bargaining past that date, employees
enrolled in the discontinued plan would have to change plans before the end of
the year. The Employer therefore
proposed separate bargaining over an interim agreement for health insurance.
The Employer submitted its proposal for such an interim agreement,
offering employees a choice of several health insurance plans including a
catastrophic insurance plan as a default. The
Union opposed bargaining over health insurance on an individual, interim
basis. The Employer responded
that interim health insurance might be necessary because employees enrolled in
the discontinued plan might be forced into the catastrophic default plan on
January 1, 2003. Throughout
September and October, the parties continued to disagree over both the
necessity of an interim health insurance and also over the terms of any health
insurance package. In
early November, the Employer stated that a deadline of November 30 for open
enrollment in health plans may be necessary to avoid jeopardizing employee
plan enrollments. The Employer
also stated that the parties could continue to bargain over health insurance
as part of an overall agreement. At
the close of the parties' November 15 session, the Employer announced that it
would implement its proposal for interim health insurance, effective January
1, 2003. The Employer stated that
it did not think the parties could wait any longer and that the Employer's
proposal was as close to the status quo as possible given the withdrawal of
one of the existing plans. Later
that day, the Employer posted a flyer to advise employees of its decision to
implement. We
decided that the Employer was privileged to seek bargaining over the discrete
issue of interim health insurance where some coverage was scheduled to expire
during the parties' negotiations. Therefore,
if the parties had bargained to a good-faith impasse over just this issue, the
Employer would have been privileged to implement its proposal without reaching
an overall impasse for an entire agreement.
We also decided, however, that the parties were not at impasse over
interim health insurance when the Employer implemented its alternative
proposal. Thus, the Employer’s
implementation of its own interim insurance proposal was unlawful. During
negotiations for a new bargaining agreement, an employer may not unilaterally
implement changes unless the parties have reached an overall bargaining
impasse on the entire bargaining agreement.
Pleasantview Nursing Home, 335 NLRB 961, 962 (2001). However,
the Board recognizes an exception to this general rule: when a "discrete
event" occurs during contract negotiations so that bargaining can not
wait for an overall impasse, an employer may bargain to impasse over a single
subject rather than over an entire agreement.
Brannan Sand & Gravel, 314 NLRB 282 (1994); Stone
Container, 313 NLRB 336 (1993). We
decided that this "discrete event" exception applied here because
the parties might have had to act prior to an overall bargaining impasse in
order to ensure continued health insurance coverage of certain employees.
We noted that the Employer proposed that the parties continue to
bargain for an overall bargaining agreement which would also address health
insurance coverage and could supersede any interim agreement. Even
though the Employer was privileged to bargain for an interim agreement on
health insurance, we further decided that the Employer had unlawfully
implemented its alternative health insurance proposal.
There was no evidence that the parties had been at impasse prior to the
Employer's implementation. In
fact, the Employer had not even argued that the parties had reached impasse.
Employer
Lawfully Paid Strike Replacements Unilaterally
Implemented Wage Rate In
one case, we decided that the Employer did not violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act when it continued to pay strike replacements unilaterally
implemented wage rates after the strike ended, but before any strikers had
been recalled and before agreement was reached on a new contract.
Similarly, the Employer did not violate the Act when it refused to
engage in separate bargaining over the replacements’ wages apart from
negotiations over a successor agreement for the entire unit.
When
the most recent collective-bargaining agreement expired, the Employer and the
Union were unable to reach agreement on a successor contract, and bargaining
unit employees engaged in an economic strike that lasted approximately one
year. During the strike, the
Employer hired permanent replacements at higher starting wage rates than
provided for in the expired contract. After
the Union made an unconditional offer to return to work, the Employer
continued to operate with the permanent replacements.
The Employer also continued to pay the strike replacements at
the unilaterally set wage rates. The
strikers were placed on a preferential hire list, but none of the strikers
were recalled to work as there were no vacancies. The
parties did not resume negotiations for a successor contract until some seven
months after the strike ended. However,
approximately five months after the end of the strike, the Union claimed the
Employer was violating the expired collective-bargaining agreement by failing
to pay the strike replacements the contractual wage rates and periodic
increases set forth in that agreement. The
Union requested that the Employer bargain about the alleged contract
violation. The Union argued that
the Employer was required to pay the replacements in accordance with the wage
rates and periodic increases in the parties’ expired contract.
The Employer argued that it had no obligation to pay the replacements
in accordance with the expired agreement.
The
Employer’s normal bargaining obligations do not extend to the terms and
conditions of employment for replacements of striking employees during a
strike because a union cannot be expected to represent the interests of the
replacements equally with the interests of the strikers and an employer cannot
be effectively prohibited from hiring replacements.
Detroit Newspapers,
327 NLRB 871 (1999); Capitol-Husting
Co., 252 NLRB 43, 45 (1980), enfd. 671 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1982).
In Service Electric Co.,
281 NLRB 633 (1986), the Board adopted the administrative law judge’s
determination that the employer was not required to pay strike replacements in
accordance with the terms of an expired collective-bargaining agreement under
the circumstances of that case. The
administrative law judge based his decision primarily on his determination
that the evidence failed to establish that the strike had ended.
However, the administrative law judge further determined that even if
the strike had ended, the Employer would not be required to pay the
replacements the contractual wage rates because the underlying dispute had not
been resolved, the strikers had not offered to return to work, and the
replacements continued to work. The
administrative law judge reasoned that because the unreinstated strikers’
jobs continued to be occupied by replacements, the positions of the parties
did not differ from their positions during the strike.
The administrative law judge also noted that diverting the parties’
attention from their principal focus of reaching agreement on a new contract
to negotiating an agreement on the entirely separate issue of the
replacements’ wages would not further the overall bargaining process. In
Detroit Newspapers,
327 NLRB at 871, fn. 1 (1999), the Board refused
to pass on the issue of the continuation of different terms and
conditions of employment for replacements after a strike has ended.
However, the Board noted that after the strike has ended and the
underlying labor dispute has been resolved, it is clear that strike
replacements become members of the bargaining unit, and their employment terms
are governed by the newly negotiated contract.
Id. at 871. In
Grinnell Fire Protection Systems,
332 NLRB 1345 (2000), enfd. in part, 272 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2001), an
information request case, the Board reiterated that once a strike is over, any
replacements who remain employed assume the same status as other unit
employees and the terms under which they work will be governed by any newly
bargained contract. The Board
noted that the union was entitled to information regarding strike
replacements, not because it could insist on bargaining over the terms under
which they worked as strike replacements, but because in bargaining for a new
agreement, it was bargaining over terms that would be applicable to all unit
employees, including those who worked as replacements. We
determined that the Act does not require an employer to pay strike
replacements in accordance with the expired collective-bargaining agreement
under circumstances where the strike has ended, but no strikers have been
recalled and no new contract has been reached.
Service Electric Co,
supra. Rather, the
Union is in a position to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment
of the strike replacements when it bargains for a new agreement on behalf of
the entire unit. See Grinnell
Fire Protection Systems, supra. UNION
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION Unions
May Not Compel Beck Objectors to Share
Arbitration Costs or to Submit Multiple Objection Letters in Order to Receive
Fee Breakdown In
another case, we decided that a local union violated an objecting
nonmember’s rights under Communications Workers of America v. Beck,
487 U.S. 735 (1988), by maintaining policies that required non-members who pay
a reduced fee to send a second objection letter in order to receive a
breakdown of the fee and that required challengers to share the cost of
arbitration. Under
the local union’s policies and procedures, employees who object to full
membership and request non-member status are sent a letter from the union
listing the percentage of fees to be paid by financial core members.
Only an employee who submits a written objection to those percentages
is considered to be an "objector."
The union then provides the objector with an explanation of how the
reduced fee was calculated and furnishes a detailed list of those categories
of expenditures deemed to be "chargeable" and
"nonchargeable." The
union also includes its independent auditor’s report indicating the union
expenditures on which the reduced fee is based.
We concluded that the union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
because its initial disclosure failed to include a breakdown of the
expenditures and calculations used to arrive at the reduced fee.
In
California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. 133 F.3d
1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 813 (1998), the Board held that
when a non-member objects to a union’s use of dues or fees for
non-representational purposes, the union must reduce the fee so that it
reflects representational expenditures only.
The union also must apprise the objector of the percentage of the
reduction, the basis for the calculation, and that there is a right to
challenge the calculation. Id.
at 233. In order to satisfy the
duty of fair representation, the information provided to the objector
regarding the basis for the calculation of the reduced fee must be
"sufficient...to enable objectors to determine whether to challenge"
the calculation. Id. at
239. The Board cited Chicago
Teachers Union Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), for its finding
that "[b]asic considerations of fairness, as well as concern for the
First Amendment rights at stake...dictate that the potential objectors be
given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s
fee." Id. at 233.
The Board then noted that the notion of "fairness" clearly
implicated a union’s statutory duty of fair representation.
Ibid. In
Hudson, supra, (a case arising in the public sector), the
Supreme Court found unlawful a union’s procedure that allowed nonmembers to
raise objections only after a deduction was made.
The Court reasoned that leaving nonunion employees in the dark about
the source of the figure for the agency fee – and requiring them to object
in order to receive information – placed an unfair burden on nonmembers.
475 U.S. at 306. We
determined that the requirement that the charging party had to submit a second
letter to receive a breakdown of expenditures placed an undue burden on his
exercise of his Beck rights. Therefore,
the union violated its duty of fair representation by failing to include in
its initial disclosure to the charging party a breakdown of the expenditures
and calculations used to arrive at the reduced fee.
Stated simply, there appeared no valid reason why the union needed a
second letter. We
noted that the Board in Teamsters, Local 443 (Connecticut Limousine
Service, Inc.), 324 NLRB 633 (1997), did not find unlawful a procedure
similar to that used in the instant case.
However, the validity of the procedure was not directly in issue in
that case. Rather, the question
before the Board was whether the Union had violated its duty of fair
representation with respect to the adequacy of its disclosure.
The Board was not faced with nor did it specifically address the issue
of the timing of the disclosure of the audited breakdown of expenses.
In footnote 5, the Board noted the General Counsel’s assertion that
the union’s disclosure of certain information was untimely.
However, the Complaint did not specifically allege an unlawful delay,
and there was no exception filed to the administrative law judge’s failure
to find a violation based on unlawful delay.
Therefore, the Board found no violation.
Moreover, the development of the law since California Saw and Connecticut
Limousine virtually mandates that unions have this information readily
available. Thus, circumstances
have changed since these cases, which virtually eliminates any argument that
the information is not immediately available and its production is burdensome. We also
concluded that the union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by requiring
the challenger to the union’s calculation of the reduced fee to pay half the
cost of the arbitrator. The
Board in California Saw and Knife Works, supra, found that a
union lawfully required a challenger to bear his own costs for transportation
to the hearing, lost time, and legal fees; however, that case is silent on the
issue of splitting the arbitrator’s fee.
By requiring that objecting nonmembers share the cost of arbitration,
the union was conditioning the individual’s use of the challenge procedure
to have his dispute heard by an impartial arbitrator on a willingness to pay
money. While it could be argued
that employees merely have a right to some appeal procedure, it was decided
that if a union establishes an arbitral procedure, employees should have an
unfettered right to use that procedure. Therefore,
it was determined that the union’s procedure in this case, which requires
employees to share the cost of arbitration, is unlawful. Beck
Notice Must Include Auditor Letter or In
this case, we decided that the Union violated its duty of fair representation
under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act because its Beck notice did not
include sufficient information to enable non-member objectors to determine
whether to challenge the Union’s dues calculations where the notice did not
include a copy of the auditor’s opinion letter or otherwise identify the
auditor. The
Union provided non-member objectors with a Beck
notice setting forth the major categories of Union expenditures and stating
that the expenditures had been audited by an independent accountant.
However, no further information was provided about the audit. Under
the duty of fair representation standard applicable to unfair labor practice
charges, a union’s breakdown of its expenditures in its Beck notice
must be verified by an audit. California
Saw & Knife Works,
320 NLRB 224, 240-242 (1995), aff’d. 133 F. 3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied 525 U.S. 813 (1998). Although
the auditor need not pass on the correctness of the union’s allocation of
expenditures to the chargeable and non-chargeable categories, the auditor must
undertake an independent verification of selected transactions and confirm the
reliability of the financial information contained in the union’s financial
reports. Television
Artists, AFTRA (KGW Radio),
327 NLRB 474, 476-477 (1999). In
a case arising in the public sector, the 9th Circuit found that the
mere representation in an agency fee notice that the financial information had
been audited was not sufficient. Rather,
the Court held that an agency fee notice to objectors must include a
certification from an independent auditor that the summarized figures had been
audited and had been correctly reproduced. Cummings v. Connell,
316 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 123 S.Ct. 2577 (2003). See also
Wessel v. City of
Albuquerque, 299 F. 3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (Notice to
agency fee objectors in the public sector must include information about the
audit itself so that objectors can determine whether to mount a challenge). Unlike
cases arising in the public sector, which are based on First Amendment
considerations, the Board analyzes a union’s duty to Beck
objectors under the duty of fair representation standard.
However, the same considerations that led the 9th Circuit to
conclude that public sector unions must provide information about their audits
to non-member objectors would also apply to unfair labor practice cases.
The Court found that without information about the audit itself,
objectors would not have sufficient information to make a determination as to
whether to challenge the union’s representational fees.
316 F.3d at 891-892. The
Board has held that the duty of fair representation includes a duty to provide
information sufficient to enable a Beck
objector to determine whether to challenge the union’s dues reduction
calculations. See
e.g., Television Artists, AFTRA, 327 NLRB at 477-478 (1999).
Thus, we determined that the duty of fair representation includes a
duty to provide information about the audit itself to enable the Beck
objectors to determine whether to mount a challenge.
We further determined that a union can fulfill its duty in this regard
if it includes in its Beck
notice a statement that the figures therein were based on an independent audit
and provides a copy of the auditor’s opinion letter. SECONDARY
BOYCOTTS Filing of Comments by Union with State Administrative Agency Constituted Unlawful Secondary Boycott When Done Solely to Impose Additional Costs on Employer
In
a case involving a novel application of BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB,
536 U.S. 516 (2002), we decided that the Union violated Section 8(b)(4) by
filing comments with a state environmental agency in opposition to the
licensing of a construction project.
The Employer had received a license from the state environmental agency
to build a hotel near a local waterfront.
The Employer then applied for an amendment to the construction license
to allow it to convert the top floors of the building to residential use. The
Employer began the initial construction of the project while the application
was pending. The Union picketed
the site in objection to the Employer’s use of a nonunion subcontractor.
Union agents indicated that the Union would be "relentless"
until they succeeded in making the project a union job, and that if the
Employer gave the work to a union contractor, "all this would go
away."
Several days after the Union withdrew its pickets as part of a
settlement with the Employer, it filed comments with the state environmental
agency objecting to the Employer’s proposed license amendment.
A local city official met with representatives of the parties in an
attempt to resolve their dispute. At
that meeting, an Employer representative asked a Union agent why the Union had
submitted "its frivolous" comment to the environmental agency.
The Union agent responded that he would do "whatever he had to do
or use any means to get the job." The
state environmental agency granted the Employer’s request for an amendment
of its construction license and the Union has filed an appeal with the agency.
We decided that the Union filed its comments with the unlawful
secondary object of forcing the Employer to cease doing business with a
nonunion subcontractor. We then
decided that the comment filing was unlawful because the Union would not have
filed the comments but for a motive to impose the costs of the litigation
process, regardless of the outcome.
We
first noted that union lobbying or petitioning a state environmental agency is
activity of the type generally protected by the First Amendment.
As such, under Edward J. Bartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), the fact that the Union’s
conduct may have a secondary object would not necessarily cause it to lose the
protection of the First Amendment. However,
we further noted that in BE & K, the Supreme Court provided
guidance as to when governmental petitioning might not enjoy First Amendment
insulation from an unfair labor practice proceeding.
In that decision, the Court majority suggested that a reasonably based
lawsuit might be considered unlawful if the suit would not have been filed
"but for" a motive to impose litigation costs on the defendant,
regardless of the outcome of the case. Although
this case did not involve a lawsuit, we applied BE & K because it
addresses the First Amendment issues implicated by government petitioning.
Though they seemed frivolous, we were unwilling to characterize the
Union’s environmental comments as baseless.
We recognized the wide discretion accorded to the state agency in
determining when the granting of a license would serve the public interest.
Given that these comments were filed in the context of a discretionary
administrative proceeding, we could not say that the comments would not, in
some respect, influence the state agency’s decision.
Nonetheless,
we decided that the Supreme Court’s language in BE & K provided a
basis for finding a violation under the Act.
Thus, even assuming the comments were reasonably based, the Union
violated Section 8(b)(4) because they would not have filed the comments
"but for a motive to impose costs on the defendant, regardless of the
outcome of the suit." BE
& K, 536 U.S. at 536-537. The
evidence showed that the only reason the Union filed the comments with the
state environmental agency was to coerce the Employer to use union
contractors. The Union never
offered a non-coercive motive for its filing of the comments or showed that it
had any real interest in the outcome of the environmental process.
In these circumstances, the Union’s filing was not genuine
petitioning, entitled to First Amendment protection, but was intended solely
to impose costs and delay on the Employer until it was coerced into using a
union contractor. And, because
the Union’s ultimate success in filing its comments was irrelevant under
this standard, there was no need to hold the matter in abeyance to await the
decision of the state environmental agency. PICKETING
FOR RECOGNITION Union Unlawfully
Picketed to Compel Employer
|
|
Category |
Number of Cases |
Results |
|
1. Interference with organizational campaign (no majority) |
3 |
Two
cases settled before petition; one case settled after petition. |
|
2. Interference with organizational campaign (majority) |
2 |
Won
one case; one case is pending. |
|
3. Subcontracting or other change to avoid bargaining obligation |
1 |
Case
settled after petition. |
|
4. Withdrawal of recognition from incumbent |
5 |
Won
four cases; one case is pending. |
|
5. Undermining of bargaining representative |
1 |
Won
case. |
|
6. Minority union recognition |
1 |
Case
settled before petition. |
|
7. Successor refusal to recognize and bargain |
1 |
Case
was withdrawn based upon changed circumstances. |
|
8. Conduct during bargaining negotiations |
0 |
-
- - |
|
9. Mass picketing and violence |
0 |
-
- - |
|
10. Notice requirements for strikes and picketing (8(d) and 8(g)) |
0 |
-
- - |
|
11. Refusal to permit protected activity on property |
0 |
-
- - |
|
12. Union coercion to achieve unlawful object |
0 |
-
- - |
|
13. Interference with access to Board processes |
0 |
-
- - |
|
14. Segregating assets |
0 |
-
- - |
|
15. Miscellaneous |
0 |
-
- - |
x:quarterly/Q4 03-Q1 04.ank
[1] The ABA Rules and Comments were amended in 2002. The Hawaii Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court is currently conducting a review of the revisions.
[2]
The Hawaii Disciplinary Counsel’s report defines managerial employees for
purposes of Rule 4.2 as “[T]hose near the apex of authority within an
organizational hierarchy. Such
employees would have the power to legally bind the organization concerning
the subject litigation and would normally be considered within the
entity’s ‘control group’.” “Control
group” is defined by the report as “Those top persons who have the
responsibility of making final decisions and those employees whose advisory
roles to top management are such that a decision would not normally be made
without those persons’ advice or opinion or whose opinions in fact form
the basis of any final decision.” (quoting
Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Service System, Inc., 128 Ill.
App.3d 763, 771, 471 N.E.2d 554, 560 (1984)).
Because Mr. Smith is an owner, officer, and director, he is in the
“apex of authority” with “responsibility of making final decisions”
for A and B, and he therefore falls within Rule 4.2.
[3]
See, e.g., Reynoso v. Greynolds Park Manor, Inc., 659 So.2d 1156,
1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]hose addressed by the Comment [4.2]
are not denominated ‘employees’ but ‘persons.’
The Rule presumably covers independent contractors whose relationship
with the organization may have placed them in the factual position
contemplated by the Comment”); Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Associates, Ltd.,
59 P. 1237, 1245 (Supr. Nevada 2002) (The Rule 4.2 test prohibits “direct
contacts with employees and agents”).
EEOC | NLRB | Supreme Court | Employment Law Blog | Arbitration Blog | Employment Law 101