« January 2008 | Main | March 2008 »
25 words on Federal Express Corp v. Holowecki
February 27, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
In Federal Express Corp v. Holowecki (US Supreme Court 02/27/2008) (7-2) the Supreme Court came to grips with a long-standing legal question: Whether an employee alleging discrimination gets the ball rolling (and stops the statute of limitations) by filing what the EEOC calls an "intake questionnaire." The answer is "Yes."
The Supreme Court decision in 25 words:
EEOC's "intake questionnaire" can serve as a "charge," because the statute doesn't define "charge" and EEOC regulations fill in the gaps in a reasonable way.
The Official Syllabus:
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) requires that "[n]o civil action ... be commenced ... until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" (EEOC), 29 U. S. C. §626(d), but does not define the term "charge." After petitioner delivery service (FedEx) initiated programs tying its couriers' compensation and continued employment to certain performance benchmarks, respondent Kennedy (hereinafter respondent), a FedEx courier over age 40, filed with the EEOC, in December 2001, a Form 283 "Intake Questionnaire" and a detailed affidavit supporting her contention that the FedEx programs discriminated against older couriers in violation of the ADEA. In April 2002, respondent and others filed this ADEA suit claiming, inter alia, that the programs were veiled attempts to force out, harass, and discriminate against older couriers. FedEx moved to dismiss respondent's action, contending she had not filed the "charge" required by §626(d). Respondent countered that her Form 283 and affidavit constituted a valid charge, but the District Court disagreed and granted FedEx's motion. The Second Circuit reversed.
Held:
1. In addition to the information required by the implementing regulations, i.e., an allegation of age discrimination and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a "charge" under the ADEA it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee.
(a) There is little dispute that the EEOC's regulations-so far as they go-are reasonable constructions of the statutory term "charge" and are therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 . However, while the regulations give some content to the term charge, they fall short of a comprehensive definition. Thus, the issue is the guidance the regulations give. Title 29 CFR §1626.3 says: "charge shall mean a statement filed with the [EEOC] which alleges that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage in acts in violation of the Act." Section 1626.8(a) identifies information a "charge should contain," including: the employee's and employer's names, addresses, and phone numbers; an allegation that the employee was the victim of age discrimination; the number of employees of the charged employer; and a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state proceedings. Section 1626.8(b), however, seems to qualify these requirements by stating that a charge is "sufficient" if it meets the requirements of §1626.6-i.e., if it is "in writing and ... name[s] the prospective respondent and ... generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s)." That the meaning of charge remains unclear, even with the regulations, is evidenced by the differing positions of the parties and the Courts of Appeals on the matter.
(b) Just as this Court defers to reasonable statutory interpretations, an agency is entitled to deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, unless its position is " ' plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,' " Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 . The Court accords such deference to the EEOC's position that its regulations identify certain requirements for a charge but do not provide an exhaustive definition. It follows that a document meeting §1626.6's requirements is not a charge in every instance. The language in §§1626.6 and 1626.8 cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of the regulations. While the regulations' structure is less than clear, the relevant provisions are grouped under the title, "Procedures-Age Discrimination in Employment Act." A permissible reading is that the regulations identify the procedures for filing a charge but do not state the full contents of a charge.
(c) That does not resolve this case because the regulations do not state what additional elements are required in a charge. The EEOC submits, in accordance with a position it has adopted in internal directives over the years, that the proper test is whether a filing, taken as a whole, should be construed as a request by the employee for the EEOC to take whatever action is necessary to vindicate her rights.
(d) The EEOC acted within its authority in formulating its request-to-act requirement. The agency's policy statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives, interpret not only its regulations but also the statute itself. Assuming these interpretive statements are not entitled to full Chevron deference, they nevertheless are entitled to a "measure of respect" under the less deferential standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 , see Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461 , whereby the Court considers whether the agency has consistently applied its position, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 . Here, the relevant interpretive statement has been binding on EEOC staff for at least five years. True, the agency's implementation has been uneven; e.g., its field office did not treat respondent's filing as a charge, and, as a result, she filed suit before the EEOC could initiate conciliation with FedEx. Such undoubted deficiencies are not enough, however, to deprive an agency that processes over 175,000 inquiries a year of all judicial deference. Moreover, the charge must be defined in a way that allows the agency to fulfill its distinct statutory functions of enforcing antidiscrimination laws, see 29 U. S. C. §626(d), and disseminating information about those laws to the public, see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§705(i), 705(g)(3).
(e) FedEx's view that because the EEOC must act "[u]pon receiving ... a charge," 29 U. S. C. §626(d), its failure to do so means the filing is not a charge, is rejected as too artificial a reading of the ADEA. The statute requires the aggrieved individual to file a charge before filing a lawsuit; it does not condition the individual's right to sue upon the agency taking any action. Cf. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106 . Moreover, because the filing of a charge determines when the ADEA's time limits and procedural mechanisms commence, it would be illogical and impractical to make the definition of charge dependent upon a condition subsequent over which the parties have no control. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 . Pp. 12-13.
2. The agency's determination that respondent's December 2001 filing was a charge is a reasonable exercise of its authority to apply its own regulations and procedures in the course of the routine administration of the statute it enforces.
(a) Respondent's completed Form 283 contained all the information outlined in 29 CFR §1626.8, and, although the form did not itself request agency action, the accompanying affidavit asked the EEOC to "force [FedEx] to end [its] age discrimination plan." FedEx contends unpersuasively that, in context, the latter statement is ambiguous because the affidavit also stated: "I have been ... assur[ed] by [the EEOC] that this Affidavit will be considered confidential ... and will not be disclosed ... unless it becomes necessary ... to produce the affidavit in a formal proceeding." This argument reads too much into the nondisclosure assurances. Respondent did not request the EEOC to avoid contacting FedEx, but stated only her understanding that the affidavit itself would be kept confidential and, even then, consented to disclosure of the affidavit in a "formal proceeding." Furthermore, respondent checked a box on the Form 283 giving consent for the EEOC to disclose her identity to FedEx. The fact that respondent filed a formal charge with the EEOC after she filed her District Court complaint is irrelevant because postfiling conduct does not nullify an earlier, proper charge.
(b) Because the EEOC failed to treat respondent's filing as a charge in the first instance, both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA's informal dispute resolution process. The court that hears the merits can attempt to remedy this deficiency by staying the proceedings to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement. While that remedy is imperfect, it is unavoidable in this case. However, the ultimate responsibility for establishing a clearer, more consistent process lies with the EEOC, which should determine, in the first instance, what revisions to its forms and processes are necessary or appropriate to reduce the risk of future misunderstandings by those who seek its assistance.
440 F. 3d 558, affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and STEVENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.
|
|
25 words on Sprint/United Management
February 26, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
Lots of people held out a false hope that Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn (US Supreme Court 02/26/2008) would decide whether so-called "me-too" evidence could be used in a discrimination case. They hoped for a bright line to be drawn that would settle the question for all future cases.
Well, I'm sorry, but this case was not so much an employment law case as it was an evidence case. It turned on the proper role of the trial courts versus the appellate courts in applying the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Here's what I learned in law school (oh so long ago) and what this decision actually says - in 25 words:
It is the trial court that decides fact-sensitive questions on the relevance of evidence, subject to abuse-of-discretion review. Let the trial court do its job.
It took the Supreme Court only nine pages, with a unanimous decision.
Now everyone can go back to their specific cases and continue to work through the difficult questions of relevance that will - as always - turn on the specific facts of the individual case. There will not be one single answer that will fit all cases.
|
|
Supreme Court reverses "me too" evidence decision
February 26, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn (US Supreme Court 02/26/2008)
Official Syllabus:
In respondent Mendelsohn's age discrimination case, petitioner Sprint moved in limine to exclude the testimony of former employees alleging discrimination by supervisors who had no role in the employment decision Mendelsohn challenged, on the ground that such evidence was irrelevant to the case's central issue, see Fed. Rules Evid. 401, 402, and unduly prejudicial, see Rule 403. Granting the motion, the District Court excluded evidence of discrimination against those not "similarly situated" to Mendelsohn. The Tenth Circuit treated that order as applying a per se rule that evidence from employees of other supervisors is irrelevant in age discrimination cases, concluded that the District Court abused its discretion by relying on the Circuit's Aramburu case, determined that the evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and remanded for a new trial.
Held: The Tenth Circuit erred in concluding that the District Court applied a per se rule and thus improperly engaged in its own analysis of the relevant factors under Rules 401 and 403, rather than remanding the case for the District Court to clarify its ruling.
(a) In deference to a district court's familiarity with a case's details and its greater experience in evidentiary matters, courts of appeals uphold Rule 403 rulings unless the district court has abused its discretion. Here, the Tenth Circuit did not accord due deference to the District Court. The District Court's two-sentence discussion of the evidence neither cited nor gave any other indication that the decision relied on Aramburu or suggested that the court applied a per se rule of inadmissibility. Neither party's submissions to the District Court suggested that Aramburu was controlling. That court's use of the same "similarly situated" phrase that Aramburu used cannot be presumed to indicate adoption of Aramburu's analysis, for the District Court was addressing a very different kind of evidence here. And the nature of Sprint's argument was not that the particular evidence was never admissible, but only that such evidence lacked sufficient probative value in this case to be relevant or outweigh prejudice and delay.
(b) Because of the Tenth Circuit's error, it went on to assess the relevance of the evidence itself and conduct its own balancing of probative value and potential prejudicial effect when it should have allowed the District Court to make these determinations in the first instance, explicitly and on the record.
466 F. 3d 1223, vacated and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
|
|
Arbitrator, not Labor Commissioner, decides issues
February 20, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
Preston v Ferrer (US Supreme Court, February 20, 2008).
8 to 1, US Supreme Court today holds that issues are to be decided by an arbitrator, not by the California Labor Commissioner. No surprises here.
The official syllabus:
A contract between respondent Ferrer, who appears on television as “Judge Alex,” and petitioner Preston, an entertainment industry attorney, requires arbitration of “any dispute … relating to the [contract’s] terms … or the breach, validity, or legality thereof … in accordance with [American Arbitration Association (AAA)] rules.” Preston invoked this provision to gain fees allegedly due under the contract. Ferrer thereupon petitioned the California Labor Commissioner (Labor Commissioner) for a determination that the contract was invalid and unenforceable under California’s Talent Agencies Act (TAA) because Preston had acted as a talent agent without the required license. After the Labor Commissioner’s hearing officer denied Ferrer’s motion to stay the arbitration, Ferrer filed suit in state court seeking to enjoin arbitration, and Preston moved to compel arbitration. The court denied Preston’s motion and enjoined him from proceeding before the arbitrator unless and until the Labor Commissioner determined she lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. While Preston’s appeal was pending, this Court held, in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440 , that challenges to the validity of a contract requiring arbitration of disputes ordinarily “should … be considered by an arbitrator, not a court.” Affirming the judgment below, the California Court of Appeal held that the TAA vested the Labor Commissioner with exclusive original jurisdiction over the dispute, and that Buckeye was inapposite because it did not involve an administrative agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a disputed issue.Held: When parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., supersedes state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative. Pp. 4–16.
(a) The issue is not whether the FAA preempts the TAA wholesale. Instead, the question is simply who decides—the arbitrator or the Labor Commissioner—whether Preston acted as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of the TAA, as Ferrer claims, or as a personal manager not governed by the TAA, as Preston contends. P. 4.
(b) FAA §2 “declare[s] a national policy favoring arbitration” when the parties contract for that mode of dispute resolution. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1 , 10. That national policy “appli[es] in state as well as federal courts” and “foreclose[s] state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.” Id., at 16. The FAA’s displacement of conflicting state law has been repeatedly reaffirmed. See, e.g., Buckeye, 546 U. S., at 445–446; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265 . A recurring question under §2 is who should decide whether “grounds … exist at law or in equity” to invalidate an arbitration agreement. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395 , which originated in federal court, this Court held that attacks on an entire contract’s validity, as distinct from attacks on the arbitration clause alone, are within the arbitrator’s ken. Buckeye held that the same rule applies in state court. See 546 U. S., at 446.
Buckeye largely, if not entirely, resolves the present dispute. The contract at issue clearly “evidenc[ed] a transaction involving commerce” under §2, and Ferrer has never disputed that the contract’s written arbitration provision falls within §2’s purview. Ferrer sought invalidation of the contract as a whole. He made no discrete challenge to the validity of the arbitration clause, and thus sought to override that clause on a ground Buckeye requires the arbitrator to decide in the first instance. Pp. 5–6.
(c) Ferrer attempts to distinguish Buckeye, urging that the TAA merely requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before the parties proceed to arbitration. This argument is unconvincing. Pp. 6–12.
(1) Procedural prescriptions of the TAA conflict with the FAA’s dispute resolution regime in two basic respects: (1) One TAA provision grants the Labor Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide an issue that the parties agreed to arbitrate, see Buckeye, 546 U. S., at 446; (2) another imposes prerequisites to enforcement of an arbitration agreement that are not applicable to contracts generally, see Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S. 681 . Pp. 7–8.
(2) Ferrer contends that the TAA is compatible with the FAA because the TAA provision vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Labor Commissioner merely postpones arbitration. That position is contrary to the one Ferrer took in the California courts and does not withstand examination. Arbitration, if it ever occurred following the Labor Commissioner’s decision, would likely be long delayed, in contravention of Congress’ intent “to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1 . Pp. 8–10.
(3) Ferrer contends that the conflict between the arbitration clause and the TAA should be overlooked because Labor Commissioner proceedings are administrative rather than judicial. The Court rejected a similar argument in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20 . Pp. 10–12.
(d) Ferrer’s reliance on Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468 , is misplaced for two reasons. First, arbitration was stayed in Volt to accommodate litigation involving third parties who were strangers to the arbitration agreement. Because the contract at issue in Volt did not address the order of proceedings and included a choice-of-law clause adopting California law, the Volt Court recognized as the gap filler a California statute authorizing the state court to stay either third-party court proceedings or arbitration proceedings to avoid the possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue. Here, in contrast, the arbitration clause speaks to the matter in controversy; both parties are bound by the arbitration agreement; the question of Preston’s status as a talent agent relates to the validity or legality of the contract; there is no risk that related litigation will yield conflicting rulings on common issues; and there is no other procedural void for the choice-of-law clause to fill. Second, the Court is guided by its decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52 . Although the Volt contract provided for arbitration in accordance with AAA rules, 489 U. S., at 470, n. 1, Volt never argued that incorporation of those rules by reference trumped the contract’s choice-of-law clause, so this Court never addressed the import of such incorporation. In Mastrobuono, the Court reached that open question, declaring that the “best way to harmonize” a New York choice-of-law clause and a clause providing for arbitration in accordance with privately promulgated arbitration rules was to read the choice-of-law clause “to encompass substantive principles that New York courts would apply, but not to include [New York’s] special rules limiting [arbitrators’] authority.” 514 U. S., at 63–64. Similarly here, the “best way to harmonize” the Ferrer-Preston contract’s adoption of the AAA rules and its selection of California law is to read the latter to encompass prescriptions governing the parties’ substantive rights and obligations, but not the State’s “special rules limiting [arbitrators’] authority.” Ibid. Pp. 12–15.
145 Cal. App. 4th 440, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, reversed and remanded.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
|
|
Gómez-Pérez v. Potter prediction
February 19, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
Paul Secunda has read the US Supreme Court transcript from today's oral argument in Gómez-Pérez v. Potter [Details, briefs] and concludes that the employer will win 5:4. His comments appear at the Workplace Prof Blog and at SCOTUSblog.
The issue is whether federal employees can state a claim for retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
Well, I've also read the transcript. Paul is correct that the employer will win, but I don't see the case being decided by a close vote. Anything closer than 7:2 will surprise me.
Why? The ADEA sets up a dual scheme for private employers and for federal employers. Those who work for private employers have an express statutory provision that forbids retaliation. Those who work for a federal employer do not. Under the most elementary rules of statutory interpretation, this means federal employees do not have a claim for retaliation. There's no way four Justices are going to strain the language of the statute to reach the result that Gómez-Pérez wants them to reach.
|
|
Three new Supreme Court cases
February 19, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
US Supreme Court will hear case on union's waiver of court forum for statutory claim.
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett (Certiorari granted February 19, 2008) [Details, briefs]
When employees sued claiming age discrimination, the employer filed a motion to compel them to take the case to arbitration. The employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement which prohibited age discrimination and also said "All such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure [in the collective bargaining agreement] as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations." The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, and the 2nd Circuit affirmed. The 2nd Circuit held that "arbitration provisions contained in a [collective bargaining agreement], which purport to waive employees' rights to a federal forum with respect to statutory claims, are unenforceable."
See discussion of this case at Daily Developments in EEO Law and at ADR Prof Blog: Supreme Court hears third arbitration case this term: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett and at Workplace Prof Blog: Supreme Court Certs
US Supreme Court will hear case on union's use of agency fees for out-of-unit litigation.
Locke v. Karass (Certiorari granted February 19, 2008) [Details, briefs]
The Maine State Employees Association (MSEA) is the exclusive bargaining agent for certain state workers, and collects compulsory "agency fees" from non-members who are in the bargaining unit. Some of these fees are transferred to Service Employees International Union (SEIU), MSEA's national affiliate. MSEA included in its calculation of chargeable expenditures those costs of litigation (by both itself and SEIU) that was germane to collective bargaining. This meant that nonmembers contributed, through their service fees, to some litigation that was not undertaken specifically for their own bargaining unit, but rather was conducted by or on behalf of other units or the national affiliate, sometimes in other states. Included within this general category of expenditures were the salaries of SEIU's lawyers, and other costs of providing legal services to bargaining units throughout the country. Costs of litigation that was not related to collective bargaining, however, were not included in the service fees assessed to MSEA's nonmembers. The 1st Circuit held that MSEA may lawfully charge non-members for this "extra-unit litigation" so long as it is germane to the union's collective bargaining duties.
US Supreme Court will hear case on ERISA anti-alienation.
Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for Dupont Savings and Investment Plan (Certiorari granted February 19, 2008)
Decision below: 5th Cir 08/15/2007
William Kennedy's ERISA plan contained a no-alienation provision. William designated his wife Liv as the sole beneficiary. Upon their divorce, Liv agreed to be divested of all her rights. However, there was no Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). The 5th Circuit held that an ERISA Qualified Domestic Relations Order is the only valid way a divorcing spouse can waive her right to receive her ex-husband's pension benefits under ERISA.
|
|
Employment retaliation at the Supreme Court
February 18, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
This week the US Supreme Court will hear two cases that will decide whether it is illegal for an employer to retaliate against an employee for complaining about discrimination.
It's already clear that retaliation is unlawful under Title VII, and under the private sector provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and other statutes I won't mention here.
The questions raised this week in two cases are
- Gómez-Pérez v. Potter (oral argument February 19) [details, briefs]
Whether, for a federal employee, the ADEA prohibits retaliation for filing an EEO complaint.
Gómez-Pérez sued claiming that her federal employer (the USPS) retaliated against her because she filed an equal employment opportunity complaint with her employer alleging discrimination on the basis of age. The 1st Circuit held that the ADEA does not provide a cause of action for retaliation by federal employers. Applying ADEA Section 15 (29 USC Section 633a), the 1st Circuit reasoned that the statutory prohibition against "discrimination" does not include a prohibition against retaliation. In contrast, the parallel provision (Section 623(d)) governing private employers specifically prohibits retaliation. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 1st Circuit's judgment.
- CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries (oral argument Febrary 20) [details, briefs]
Whether 42 USC section 1981 provides a cause of action for retaliation.
Humphries sued under 42 USC Section 1981 claiming that his employer discharged him in retaliation for complaining to managers about (a) disciplinary actions taken against him allegedly because of his race, and (b) the discharge of another employee allegedly because of that employee's race. Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." There is no express mention of retaliation. The 7th Circuit held (2-1) that Section 1981 provides a cause of action for retaliation. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 7th Circuit's judgment.
A third retaliation case is on the docket, but it looks like the oral argument will be put off until October. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee [details, briefs] - Crawford claimed she was discharged because she cooperated in her employer's investigation of sexual harassment complaints against another employee. No EEOC charge had been filed prior to the investigation. Title VII Section 704(a) protects an employee from retaliation because the employee "has opposed" an unlawful employment practice or "participated in any manner in an investigation ... under this chapter." The 6th Circuit held that Crawford was not protected by either the "opposition" clause or the "participation" clause. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 6th Circuit's judgment.
Other comments on these cases:
Workplace Prof Blog: Big Week at Supreme Court for Employment Retaliation Cases
ACS Blog: Three Retaliation Claims Cases Reach the Supreme Court: Video Excerpts (with videos)
|
|
A new name
February 11, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
How exciting!
A new name for this blog: LawMemo Employment Law Blog.
(Was Ross' Employment Law Blog)
It's all about branding.
The brand is LawMemo.
LawMemo is the name of the company, and the domain name.
The words "Law Memo" are part of our three email products:
- Employment Law Memo
- NLRB Law Memo
- Arbitration Law Memo
What could be more exciting than that?
|
|
Ready for new FMLA regulations?
February 09, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
Department of Labor's proposed amendments to its regulations under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) will be filed in the Federal Register on February 11, 2008. Comments must be received on or before April 11, 2008. The filing includes both proposed changes to previously-adopted regulations and a request for input on for new regulations implementing the new statute dealing with military family leave.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comments (02/11/2008) [477 pages]
(1) Previous regulations are reorganized. There are substantive changes dealing with the definition of "serious health condition," required notices, joint employers, light duty, overtime, bonuses, substituting paid leave for FMLA leave, voluntary settlement of claims, employer's failure to designate absences as being FMLA leave, and other matters.
(2) DOL seeks public comment on issues to be addressed in final regulations dealing with military family leave. (Statutory amendments providing FMLA leave to care for a covered servicemember became effective January 28, 2008. A statutory amendment providing FMLA leave for "qualifying exigencies" arising out of a family member's active duty or call to active duty are not effective until DOL issues regulations defining "qualified exigencies.")
|
|
Maggie Jacobsen Dies
February 03, 2008 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo
Maggie Jacobsen, Former Member of the National Mediation Board Dies
Magdalena (Maggie) Jacobsen—the daughter of a tugboat captain—who became one of the most prominent women in labor relations has died.
Maggie started her career in 1962 as a flight attendant for Continental Airlines, became a representative of her Union, the Steward and Stewardess Division of the Airline Pilots Association, and was elected national secretary-treasurer of the Union that represented over 20,000 flight attendants who flew on 20 air carriers.
In 1971, Jacobsen studied at the AFL-CIO Labor Studies Program and earned a certificate in labor studies there.
In 1973, she completed Harvard University’s Trade Union Program.
She earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Organizational Behavior in 1987 and—in 1989—an MS in Human Resource Management.
In 1972, Maggie became Manager of Labor Relations for Continental Airlines.
Jacobsen became Employee Relations Director for the City and County of San Francisco in 1991 and provided leadership to 93 departments, divisions and commissions in their relations with the 45 labor organizations that represented some 33,000 public employees.
In 1976, she became a Commissioner (mediator) in the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), a government agency providing services—in large part—to private sector parties engaged in collective bargaining.
In 1992 she accepted assignment to the Portland FMCS office and, while there, organized the Oregon Chapter of the Industrial Relations Research Association (IRRA)—now called the Labor and Employment Relations Association.
In 1998 Maggie was elected national president of IRRA, the one organization in labor relations that serves the interests of the entire labor relations community: academics, labor, management, and neutrals.
In 1993, President Clinton nominated Maggie Jacobsen to the National Mediation Board, the federal agency with jurisdiction over collective bargaining in the airline and railroad industries.
She was confirmed by the United States Senate and served three terms, including service as the Board’s Chairperson.
Maggie mediated the 1994 to 1996 national rail negotiations that produced the longest period of labor peace in that industry in 22 years.
Both parties gave her the title “Iron Lady” in testimony to her efforts to bring the parties to agreement.
She returned to the Pacific Northwest in 2002, where she began a private practice as a mediator and arbitrator.
In 2005 Maggie moved to Camas, Washington, where she continued her practice as a neutral in collective bargaining.
While there she became a founding partner in OPTIONS For the Workplace, LLP, a organization that provides services jointly to unions and employees to foster constructive approaches to labor-management relations.
Magdalena Jacobsen is survived by her husband, Bruce Henricus, a retired Teamster leader, two sisters Jean Jacobsen and Annette Allen both of California, and a brother Waldemar Jacobsen of Connecticut.
The family requests that offerings in her memory be sent to the Susan G Komen for the Cure, 5005 LBJ Freeway, Suite 250, Dallas Texas 75244 and/or the Ray Hicky Hospice House, 2112 E Mill Plain Blvd, Vancouver, Washington 98661
|
|
|
Editor: Ross Runkel, Professor of Law Emeritus. email Ross@LawMemo.Com, Phone 503-399-8028. Copyright LawMemo, Inc.
|
