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State controls interstate overtime
March 06, 2007 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo

Larie Bostain was an interstate truck driver who wanted to be paid overtime, as required by Washington State's Minimum Wage Act. Although he worked in excess of 40 hours per week, he did not work more than 40 hours a week within the State of Washington.

The problem for the courts was whether to count all hours worked, or only hours worked within the State of Washington.

Held, in a 5-4 vote: Overtime pay for Washington interstate truck drivers included time driving outside Washington. Bostain v. Food Express (Washington 03/01/2007) Majority Opinion | Dissenting Opinon

The issue for the Washington Supreme Court was whether the Washington State's Minimum Wage Act (MWA) applied to interstate truckers whether driving within the state or outside the state.

The court noted that Bostain was a Washington employee. The court interpreted the MWA for overtime (RCW 49.46.130) to apply to Washington employees driving in state and driving outside Washington. The court concluded that the Department of Labor and Industries rules (WAC 296-128-011 and WAC 296-128-012), defining hours for purposes of the overtime provisions, as hours worked within Washington's borders were not consistent with the plain language of the statutes being implemented, nor with the stated purpose of the MWA, nor with the principles that apply to interpretation of remedial legislation governing payment of wages in this state. The court rejected the employer's commerce clause violation argument.

The majority thought this result was required by the plain language of the statute.

The DISSENT thought the opposite conclusion was required by the plain language of the statute. In addition, the dissent thought the result was prohibited by the US constitution's commerce clause.

My view: I just love it when two groups of judges use the "plain meaning" of a statute to reach opposite conclusions. Doesn't that fact, all by itself, nean that there is no plain meaning? Go figure.

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Editor: Ross Runkel, Professor of Law Emeritus. email Ross@LawMemo.Com, Phone 503-399-8028. Copyright LawMemo, Inc.

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