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Romantically motivated favoritism is not sex discrimination
February 10, 2005 by Ross Runkel at LawMemo

Yesterday's decision in Preston v. Wisconsin Health Fund [Full text pdf] (7th Cir 02/09/2005) demonstrates that Title VII wasn't designed to keep supervisors from playing job favoritism with the objects of their romantic interest. It also demonstrates that Judge Posner's decisions continue to be interesting reading.

Jay Preston, a male, claimed he lost his job to a woman who was romantically involved with his supervisor. He claimed that the loss of his job was the result of his supervisor's favoritism toward the replacement, which resulted from the romantic relationship, and that this constituted gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. He also claimed that the two conspired to tortiously interfere with his contractual relationship with his employer. The 7th Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer.

1) With respect to the Title VII claim, the court concluded that "[a] male executive's romantically motivated favoritism toward a female subordinate is not sex discrimination even when it disadvantages a male competitor of the woman." The court observed that "[t]he effect on the composition of the workplace is likely to be nil, especially since the disadvantaged competitor is as likely to be another woman as a man .... Neither in purpose nor in consequence can favoritism resulting from a personal relationship be equated to sex discrimination."

2) With respect to the tortious interference claim, the court observed, "to avoid converting employment at will into employment terminable only for cause, the cases require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had an improper motive." The court continued, "unless courts are to be overwhelmed by suits by disgruntled former employees against corporate officers, more is required than that a discharge be tainted by some private motive, such as greed, personal dislike, or, in this case perhaps, a personal attachment to a competing employee .... The plaintiff must prove both that the employer did not benefit from the defendant's act and that the act was independently tortious, for example as fraud or defamation." The court concluded that Preston failed to satisfy this standard.

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