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« Arbitration Law Memo February 2006 | Main | Arbitration Law Memo April 2006 »

Arbitration Law Memo March 2006
by Ross Runkel at LawMemo

Arbitration Law Memo - March 2006
by LawMemo - World's Best

Also available by free monthly email.

*** Arbitration - Individual Contracts ***

*** Arbitration - Collective Bargaining Agreements ***

*** Arbitration - Individual Contracts ***

IL - Arbitration agreement does not depend on "knowing and voluntary" consent.

Melena v. Anheuser-Busch (Illinois 03/23/2006)
http://www.lawmemo.com/docs/il/melena.htm

The employer mailed a new arbitration program to employees, saying that if they continued to work they would be deemed to have accepted. Melena signed a form saying she received and understood the mailing, and she continued working. Later, Melena sued the employer claiming she was discharged because she had filed a workers compensation claim. The Illinois Supreme Court said she was bound by her agreement to arbitrate.  The court rejected Melena's argument that she did not make a "knowing and voluntary" waiver of her right to a jury trial, and stated that "knowing and voluntary" consent is not required because that is not a requirement that applies to contracts generally. The general rule is that if you sign it, then you are bound by it. The court pointed out that there is broad disagreement among the courts as to whether consent to arbitrate must be "knowing and voluntary."  The court also found that there was no inconsistency between arbitration and the state workers compensation statute.

TX - Continuing to work was acceptance of arbitration agreement.

In re Dillard Dept Stores (Texas 03/03/2006)
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2006/mar/041132.htm

The Supreme Court of Texas held that an at-will employee was bound by her employer's arbitration policy. Reversing the trial court's finding of fact, the court found that the employee attended a meeting where the arbitration policy and an acknowledgement form were distributed. Although there was no proof that the employee signed the form, she accepted the policy by continuing to work. The employee argued that the employer's promise to arbitrate was illusory because the arbitration policy, like her at-will employment, was terminable at any time. The court rejected that argument because the policy was not dependent on continued employment, and was designed to deal with claims connected with the employee's separation.

MD - Arbitration agreement enforceable even though employer retained the right to change or rescind it (5-2).

Holloman v. Circuit City Stores (Maryland 03/13/2006)
http://www.courts.state.md.us/opinions/coa/2006/53a05.pdf

Holloman sued claiming sexual discrimination by her former employer. The trial court ordered arbitration under the terms of an arbitration agreement contained in Holloman's job application. An intermediate court affirmed; the highest court of Maryland affirmed. Holloman argued that there was no consideration for her promise to arbitrate because the employer's promise to arbitrate was illusory in that the employer could change or rescind the arbitration agreement. The court rejected this argument. The employer was obligated to give 30 days notice before changing the terms of the arbitration agreement, so the employer was bound to its agreement to arbitrate for at least 30 days. That constituted consideration. The DISSENT argued that the agreement was so one-sided that it was unconscionable because there was no issue about which the employer had an interest or a need to arbitrate.

4th - Arbitrator improperly imposed a one-year limitation period (2-1).

Patten v. Signator Insurance (4th Cir 03/13/2006)
http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/051148.P.pdf

Patten sued to vacate an arbitration award; the trial court refused to vacate the award; the 4th Circuit (2-1) reversed.

Patten and Hancock Mutual agreed to arbitrate any claims arising between Patten and Hancock or any of Hancock's affiliates. Later Patten went to work for Signator (a Hancock affiliate) and entered into a new arbitration agreement that superceded the Mutual agreement. Signator discharged Patten, and he demanded arbitration of his claims for age discrimination, wrongful discharge, and breach of contract. The arbitration demand was filed 14 months after the discharge. The old Mutual agreement contained a one-year limitation period; the newer agreement was silent as to a limitation period. The arbitrator dismissed Patten's claims on the ground that he did not file within one year. The 4th Circuit ordered that the arbitrator's award be vacated for two reasons:  The arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law; and the award did not draw its essence from the contract. The arbitrator improperly looked to the superceded agreement for guidance on the question of a limitation period. The governing agreement said it was governed by Massachusetts law, which would allow either a three-year or six-year limitation period for Patten's claims. The DISSENT agreed that the arbitrator's interpretation was "clearly erroneous," but argued that "clear error alone is insufficient to vacate an arbitrator's award."

TX - Tortious interference claim against employer's parent company was subject to arbitration agreement.

In re Vesta Insurance Group (Texas 03/17/2006)

http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2006/mar/040141.pdf

An insurance agent sued his employer's parent company for tortious interference with contract after his contract was terminated.  The trial court refused to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract; the court of appeals affirmed; The Texas Supreme Court reversed.

The court recently held that Texas law, consistent with the federal law of direct-benefits estoppel, requires a nonparty to a contract to arbitrate a claim "if it seeks, through the claim, to derive a direct benefit from the contract containing the arbitration provision."  The court observed that "[w]hile the boundaries of direct-benefit estoppel are not always clear, nonparties generally must arbitrate claims if liability arises from a contract with an arbitration clause, but not if liability arises from general obligations imposed by law."  The court further observed that "[t]ortious interference claims do not fall comfortably within either category."  Since a person must be a stranger to a contract to tortiously interfere with it, "liability for tortious interference arises from the general law, [while] nonliability arises from connections with the contract." 

The court concluded, "[f]or several reasons, we hold that tortious interference claims between a signatory to an arbitration agreement and agents or affiliates of the other signatory arise more from contract than general law, and thus fall on the arbitration side of the scale."  The court noted that "many Texas courts of appeal have held that a tortious interference claim against a signatory's employees or affiliates must be arbitrated, even though the latter are nonsignatories."

LA - Employer's claims pertaining to injunctive relief were not arbitrable.

Horseshoe Entertainment v. Lepinski (Louisiana Ct App 03/08/2006)
http://www.lacoa2.org/40753ca.pdf

The employer sued Lepinski, seeking enforcement of an employment contract and stock option agreement.  Lepinski moved to compel arbitration.  The trial court granted the motion in part, compelling arbitration and staying proceedings relating only to the employer's claims for monetary damages arising from the employment agreement.  The court affirmed, stating "we decline to disturb the trial court's denial of a stay of the claims not subject to arbitration."  The court noted that "[c]learly, ... claims pertaining to injunctive relief are not arbitrable."

OH - Employer waived its right to arbitration by filing suit.

GMS Management v. Coulter (Ohio Ct App 03/17/2006)
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/11/2006/2006-ohio-1263.pdf

The employer sued Coulter for unpaid rent, and he counterclaimed for unpaid wages.  The employer then moved to dismiss the counterclaim pursuant to an arbitration agreement.  The court denied the motion, and awarded the employer its unpaid rent and Coulter his unpaid wages.  The court affirmed, concluding that the employer waived its right to arbitrate by ignoring the arbitration agreement and filing suit.

GA - Award enforcing restrictive covenants confirmed.

Malice v. Coloplast Corp (Georgia Ct App 03/23/2006)
http://www.lawmemo.com/docs/ga/malice.htm

The arbitrator award found that Malice violated restrictive covenants in his release and settlement agreement. The trial court confirmed the award. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. Applying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and federal law, the court stated that the award could be reversed if it was made in manifest disregard of the law. Malice argued that the law the arbitrator manifestly disregarded was Georgia's public policy against restraint of trade. The court, noting that this was not a contract of adhesion and that Malice had substantial bargaining power, found that the restrictive covenants were enforceable because they were founded on valuable consideration, were reasonably necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business, and did not unduly prejudice the public's interest.

*** Arbitration - Collective Bargaining Agreements ***

7th - Rule 11 sanctions upheld against employer seeking to vacate grievance arbitration award.

CUNA Mutual Insurance v. Office and Professional Employees (7th Cir 03/16/2006)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/051021p.pdf

The employer brought an action seeking to vacate a grievance arbitration award rendered in the union's favor.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the union and awarded sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.  The employer appealed only the Rule 11 sanctions.  The 7th Circuit affirmed.  The court noted that there exists a "long line of Seventh Circuit cases that have discouraged parties from challenging arbitration awards and have upheld Rule 11 sanctions in cases where the challenge to the award was substantially without merit."  In particular, in Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., v. Int'l Assoc. Machinists District 8, 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir 1986), the 7th Circuit observed that "[a] company dissatisfied with the decisions of labor arbitrators need not include an arbitration clause in its collective bargaining contracts, but having agreed to include such a clause it will not be permitted to nullify the advantages to the union by spinning out the arbitration process unconscionably through the filing of meritless suits and appeals.  For such conduct the law authorizes sanctions that this court will not hesitate to impose."  The court concluded ultimately, "[w]e find that [the employer's] claims were meritless and were very unlikely to succeed in the lower court based on the straight-forward case law relevant to these claims." [Other recent cases on sanctions: http://www.lawmemo.com/arbitrationblog/2006/03/sanctions_for_a.html ]

OH - Arbitrator to decide whether grievance arbitrable.

City of Dayton v. Dayton Public Service Union (Ohio Ct App 03/17/2006)
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/2/2006/2006-ohio-1258.pdf

The employer sued the union seeking a declaratory judgment whether the grievance was subject to arbitration. The trial court denied the employer's request for a declaratory judgment. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The court found that whether an involuntary transfer to another division constituted a layoff under article 21 of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) involved the interpretation or application of the CBA, a question for the arbitrator to decide.

6th - Union can represent retirees at arbitration if they consent.

Cleveland Electric v. Utility Workers Union (6th Cir 03/14/2006)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/6th/043567p.pdf

The union filed a grievance, on behalf of its members and retirees, relating to the company's change in health care provisions and providers. The company's position was that the grievance was not arbitrable as to the retirees, and that question was submitted to the arbitrator. The arbitrator ruled that the union had standing to seek arbitration on behalf of the retirees, and that the retiree's consent was not necessary. The company sued to vacate the arbitrator's award. The trial court held that the union had standing to represent the retirees, but that the retirees' consent was necessary. The 6th Circuit affirmed. (1) The issue of arbitrability was submitted by both parties to the arbitrator, and his decision drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. (2) It was necessary for the retirees to consent to union representation because they had statutory rights to the benefits which they could pursue against the company, and those could be lost in arbitration.

6th - Employer and union didn't modify CBA.

Spero Electric v. Intl Brotherhood of Electrical (6th Cir 02/28/2006)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/6th/044142p.pdf

The union filed a grievance over an employee's discharge for violation of the employer's no-smoking policy.  The union prevailed at arbitration, and the award was confirmed by the trial court.  The 6th Circuit reversed.  The arbitrator determined that, pursuant to an agreement with the union, the employer forfeited its right under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to unilaterally change its work rule regarding the no-smoking policy at its plant.  The court reasoned that this determination contradicted "the express terms of the CBA regarding the method of modifying that document."

NY - Arbitrator's decision on seniority was not supported by CBA.

Albany County Sheriffs v. County of Albany (New York App Div 03/23/2006)
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2006/2006_02254.htm

The arbitrator awarded a return to work at full status without retention of seniority rights. The trial court vacated that part of the award that denied seniority rights. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed the trial court. Because the arbitrator based his decision on the general definition of seniority in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) rather than the provision related to seniority during absences caused by a work related disability, the court concluded the arbitrator's decision on seniority was not supported by any reasonable construction of the CBA.

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