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![]() Ross Runkel |
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Title: Martin County Board of City Commissioners and Martin
County Public Employees: United
Date: June 21, 2005
Arbitrator: Phyllis
Almenoff
Citation: 2005 NAC 116
---------------------------------------------------------------------X
-
Between –
MARTIN
COUNTY BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS
Stuart, Florida
“Employer”
-and-
MARTIN
COUNTY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: UNITED
Stuart, Florida
“Union”
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APPEARANCES
For the Employer
David A, Young, Esq.
Counsel for Martin County
255 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1700
Orlando, Florida 32801
For the Union
Matthew J. Mierzwa, Jr.
Attorney for UPE
3900 Woodlake Boulevard, Suite 212
Lake Worth, Florida 33463
BEFORE:
DR. PHYLLIS ALMENOFF, ARBITRATOR
DECISION AND AWARD
WITNESSES TESTIFYING
COUNTY
Called by the
Employer
Harold
Markey
General Services Manager
Clifford
Jones
Building & Fleet Maintenance Supervisor – General Services
Michael
Krajnovich
Superintendent of Maintenance -Martin County Utilities
Gene
R. Hoke
Mechanic III, General Services
Cynthia
Morris
Human Resources Analyst
Also
Present
Linda
J. Skelton
Human Resources Administrator
UNION
Called
by the Union
Michael
Reese, Grievant
Electrician (Terminated), Vice President - MCPEU
Lois
Ortmann
Secretary Martin County, Secretary – MCPEU
Kimberly
Cooper
Deputy Sheriff
Thomas
Earl Newcamp
Lead
Electrician
INTRODUCTION
The grievance
was submitted to Arbitrator Phyllis Almenoff pursuant to the terms set forth in
Article 36 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties (Joint
Exhibit 1) for a final and binding resolution of the issue.
The Arbitrator was jointly selected by the parties from a list submitted
to them by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of the United States
Government.
The grievance
was appropriately processed through the steps of the grievance procedure without
a satisfactory resolution and was properly before the Arbitrator. The parties
agree that the Grievance was timely filed, and that all steps in the grievance
procedure have been exhausted without a satisfactory resolution. The Arbitrator
has jurisdiction to decide the Grievance on the merits.
The hearing
took place on April 12, 2005 at the Martin County Administration Center in
Stuart, Florida. At that time both parties were afforded full opportunity to
present testimony, offer evidence and arguments in support of their respective
positions and to cross-examine witnesses. The presentation of evidence included
four joint exhibits, sixteen Union exhibits, eight County exhibits, and the
testimony of nine witnesses. The County and the Union elected to present closing
arguments through post hearing briefs that were originally to be postmarked May
12, 2005 but was extended by mutual consent of the parties to May 19, 2005.
The record was closed upon receipt of the post hearing briefs on May 21,
2005.
STATEMENT
OF THE ISSUE
At the
hearing, both parties stipulated to the following issue:
Did the County have just cause to terminate the
Grievant under the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
PERTINENT CONTRACT LANGUAGE
Relevant
sections of the Collective Bargaining Agreement that relate to the issue are as
follows:
ARTICLE
35 -Grievance Procedure
Section
2. “Grievance” shall mean a dispute by a
grievant… that there has been an alleged violation of specific provision(s) of
this agreement…
Section
5. The following shall be followed in presenting a
grievance to the County:
Step Three: The due process hearing conducted by the County Administrator or his
designee regarding a recommendation of an employee’s suspension, demotion or
termination will also be considered a step three grievance hearing.
Steps One and Two of the grievance procedure are therefore satisfied.
The County Administrator’s response will be considered the step three
grievance response. …
ARTICLE
36 – ARBITRATION
Section5. The
arbitrator shall have no power to add to, subtract from, disregard, or modify
any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement….His powers shall be limited
to deciding whether the County has violated the expressed articles or sections
of this Agreement and fashion an appropriate remedy. On disciplinary issues, the
arbitrator will decide whether the County has acted with just cause, and he may
modify any disciplinary action taken by the County. The arbitrator’s decision shall be based upon the specific
language of the Agreement and shall not infringe upon any right reserved to the
County nor upon the collective bargaining process.
Section
8. The fees and expenses of the arbitrator shall be
paid by the losing party. …
ARTICLE
37 – DISCIPLINARY ACTION
*
* *
The
following rules are not being construed as limitations upon the retained rights
of the
County,
but merely as a guide.
Disciplinary action is intended to remedy improper
conduct or deficiencies.
*
* *
Section
1. The County Disciplinary Code as revised and
adopted by the Bargaining Union 2/28/01, and included as Exhibit “A”, shall
apply to bargaining unit employees and is subject to the full grievance
procedure including arbitration.
* * *
Section
3.
Disciplinary action may not be taken except for just cause.
* * *
EXHIBIT
A – DISCIPLINARY CODE
***
GROUP II OFFENSES
FIRST OFFENSE
ONE TO THREE DAY(S) SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
*
* *
9.
Absenteeism. Unscheduled
leave of three (3) or more times within a thirty day period without a doctor’s
statement
* * *.
GROUP III OFFENSES
FIRST OFFENSE
FIVE DAYS SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY OR DISCHARGE
SECOND OFFENSE
DISCHARGE
1.
Wanton or willful neglect in performing assigned
duties.
* * *
4.
Knowingly falsifying personal or
County records, including employment applications, accident reports, work
records, purchase orders, time sheets, or any other report, record, application
or claims.
* * *
ARTICLE
4 – MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Section 2 .
The County and the Union agree that the Board of County Commissioners and
management of the County alone shall have the authority to determine and direct
policies, mode and methods of providing its services and unilaterally set the
standards for same, without any interference in the management and conduct of
the County’s business on the part of the Union or any of its
representatives….Such rights exclusively reserved to the County shall include
but not be limited to…reprimand, discharge or otherwise discipline employees;
…to determine what records are to be made and kept, including those records
relating to hours of employees, who will make and keep these records, how the
records are to be made and kept; …
ARTICLE
22 – PAID TIME OFF
Section 3.
Charging Leave
A.
PTO shall be charged in one half (1/2) hour minimum
increment.
Section 4.
Request for leave
B.
Request to use PTO shall be made in advance, in
accordance with department rules, and in writing, whenever possible.
BACKGROUND
Martin County
(hereinafter referred to as the
“County”) recognizes Martin County Public Employees Union (hereinafter
referred to as the “Union”) as the collective bargaining representative for
wages, hours and working conditions for those employees in the unit certified by
the Public Employees Relations Commission. The Grievant is represented by the
Union through the grievance procedure, including arbitration, in accordance with
the Agreement.
Michael
Reese, the Grievant, has been employed by Martin County since September 16,
2002. He was hired as a journeyman electrician and assigned temporarily to the
prison facility. He subsequently became an electrician and was reassigned to
another County facility. There are fifty buildings and a jail in the County.
The Grievant
became active in the Union and in September of 2003, as an executive board
member, he represented another employee in a grievance that was resolved by the
County rescinding a written reprimand from the employee’s file.
As Vice
President of the Union, Mr. Reese was a member of the negotiating team.
Members of the negotiating team had previously negotiated “on their own
time” meeting after work and on Saturdays to negotiate a successor Agreement.
Starting with the previous contract and continuing the new practice,
employees negotiated on County time and were paid their regular salary for their
participation. The County
representatives and the Union representatives negotiated every Thursday starting
on or about 8:00 a.m.
This
grievance arose when M.R. was terminated for leaving the negotiation session
early on October 7th without filling out a Paid Time Off (PTO)
request form.
The
following is a memo dated October 18, 2004 from Harold Markey, Manager of the
General Services Department to Mike Reese, Electrician concerning his discharge
from employment in Martin County:
On
October 7, 2004 you left work at 3:00 PM or thereabouts and did not return.
You did not request or receive permission to leave not did
you turn in a leave form requesting this leave be deducted from your PTO account
as required. In fact you told your
supervisor, Cliff Jones, who was compiling payroll records to put you down for
eight (8) hours paid. This
represents knowingly falsifying payroll time, resulting in an overpayment of 1½
hours.
You
are being charged with an infraction of the Martin County Disciplinary Code:
Group III, #4: “Knowingly falsifying personal or County records…”
This is the second violation of a Group III offense.
Therefore, I am recommending to the County Administrator that your
employment be terminated effective October 19, 2004.
You
have a right to refute the evidence in support of this recommendation in person
or in writing to the County Administrator. * *
* (Joint Exhibit 4)
A due process hearing was held on
October 27, 2004 as a result of the recommendation for termination.
The Deputy County Administrator wrote the following letter to Mr. Reese:
**
* I have reviewed the information you presented to refute the department’s
evidence in support of the termination. I
have also reviewed additional documentation provided by the union subsequent to
the hearing.
In
conclusion, I do not find that anything presented on your behalf invalidates
that which was presented by the department.
Therefore, I must support the department’s recommendation to terminate
your employment effective October 19, 2004.
On November
12, 2004 the Union notified the County that they would be filing for arbitration
regarding the termination of Mr. Michael Reese.
POSITION
OF THE PARTIES
Position
of the County
The County
argues that there was “just cause” to terminate the Grievant under the terms
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. To support its position, the County
asserts the following arguments:
On Thursday,
October 7, 2004, Michael Reese arrived at the negotiating session on or about
8:00 a.m. (prior to the start of the session) and announced that he would be
leaving early to meet with his personal attorney about a divorce.
He was told by the President of the Union that he needed to fill out a
Paid Time Off (PTO) request form and he indicated that he would.
M.R. left the negotiating session at approximately 3:00 p.m. and did not
fill out a P.T.O form that day or the next day although he was familiar with the
process having requested paid time off to meet his attorney or for other
personal needs on other occasions. H.M.,
the General Services Manager directed C.J. to ask Mr. Reese how many hours he
had worked on Thursday, October 7, 2004. On
Monday, October 11, 2004, his immediate supervisor, C.J. asked the Grievant how
many hours he had worked on Thursday. The
Grievant indicated that he had worked all day (eight hours.) On October 18,
2004, M.R. received a memo from H.M., the Manager of the General Services
Department, informing him that he was recommending his termination effective
October 19, 2004 for violating the Martin County Disciplinary Code: Group III,
#4: Knowingly
falsifying personal or County records, including employment applications,
accident reports, work records, purchase orders, time sheets, or any other
report, record, application or claims. The
Grievant
was offered an opportunity to refute the evidence and a due process hearing was
held on October 27, 2004. The
Deputy County Administrator upheld the termination of Michael Reese.
The Grievant’s normal work day is
8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. He punches a time clock that records his work time.
Employees do not punch in on negotiation days which are normally from
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Mr. Reese has been disciplined
previously for a Group III violation: Wanton
or willful neglect in performing assigned duties and suspended for five days for an
incident that occurred on January 7, 2004.
At that time, the Grievant left a painter’s sharpened putty;
knife/scraper in a prison cell which was hidden by a maximum security inmate in
an area inhabited by three (3) convicted inmates and fifteen (15) inmates
pending murder charges. The penalty
for a Group III first offense is five days suspension or discharge, the penalty
for a second offense is discharge. Mr. Reese did not grieve the five (5) day
suspension.
He had also been disciplined previously
for another infraction of the Discipline Code. On April 1, 2004, H.M. informed
Mr. Reese that he violated the Disciplinary Code, Group II 9: Absenteeism.
Unscheduled leave of three (3) or more times within a thirty day period
without a doctor’s statement…Mr. Reese had four (4) unscheduled
absences in a thirty day period. M.R.
was suspended without pay for three (3) days. This disciplinary action was not
grieved.
Position of the Union
The Union
contends that the Grievant’s termination was not justified and that he did not
falsify county records. In
support of its position, the Union offers the following arguments:
When
interviewed for his position, the Grievant was told that he would initially be
assigned to work in the jail for six to eight weeks and then reassigned to
another facility. His first year of
employment with the County was uneventful.
His performance evaluation indicated that his overall performance
assessment “exceeded expectations” which made him eligible for a 5% increase
in salary which he received. Michael Reese is an excellent electrician. His
problems started when as a union officer, he represented another employee in a
grievance which resulted in the rescinding of a written reprimand. His
relationship with H.M., the General Service Manager deteriorated. Shortly
thereafter M.R. was reassigned to work in the jail which he felt was an
undesirable assignment because it was dangerous and disagreeable.
As Vice
President of the Union, Michael Reese was a member of the negotiating team which
met every Thursday to negotiate a successor collective bargaining agreement
rather than report to their usual work assignments.
Although, the Grievant’s normal workday is 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. which
is recorded by a time-clock, negotiating days, which are paid workdays, are not
as formalized. There is no formal process in place to record time worked on
negotiation days. Negotiation days
have concluded anywhere between 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. On Thursdays, Union negotiating team members, including the
Grievant, dressed in street clothes and street shoes rather than work uniforms
and special work shoes. According
to the testimony of L.O., Secretary to the Union, when negotiations concluded
early, the Union team members could continue to work on negotiations, return to
their regular jobs or go home. The
Grievant testified that he went
home when negotiations concluded early since he was not wearing his uniform or
safety work shoes.
On Thursday,
October 7th, 2004, the Grievant arrived for negotiations around 8:05
a.m. and spent the day negotiating. The Union engaged in a heated caucus from
2:30 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. during which the Union Secretary, L.O. became upset and
left the caucus. It was the testimony of M. R. and L.O. that the Grievant went
to her office and they worked until
approximately 3:45 when he left to keep his 4:00 p.m. appointment with his
personal attorney. The Grievant
testified that there were no references made to P.T.O. and that he was not
required to use PTO. He also
testified that when asked by G.H. how many hours he worked on October 7, the
Grievant indicated that he worked all day.
The Union
maintains that there was no investigation prior to the Grievant’s termination
On February
16, 2004 Michael Reese filed a complaint alleging hostile work environment and
retaliation that was investigated and “did not substantiate any wrong doing on
the part of General Service Management.”
Michael Reese
was the recipient of a Spirit Award nomination on behalf of all the deputies and
civilians for his “exemplary service, dedication and tireless efforts
during the recent hurricanes.”
.
FINDINGS
The issue to
be determined in this arbitration is whether the Employer had just cause to
discharge the Grievant under the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) based on all of the facts and testimony in evidence. The CBA provides
clear direction to the arbitrator and states the following in Article 36:
Section5. The
arbitrator shall have no power to add to, subtract from, disregard, or modify
any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement….His powers shall be limited
to deciding whether the County has violated the expressed articles or sections
of this Agreement and fashion an appropriate remedy. On disciplinary issues, the
arbitrator will decide whether the County has acted with just cause, and he may
modify any disciplinary action taken by the County. The arbitrator’s decision shall be based upon the specific
language of the Agreement and shall not infringe upon any right reserved to the
County nor upon the collective bargaining process.
The County contends that it had
“just cause” to terminate the Grievant for violating the County’s
Disciplinary Code. They allege that
the Grievant committed a Group III offense when he “knowingly
falsified personal or County records, including…, work records, time sheets,
or any other report, record, application or claims.” Since the Grievant had previously been disciplined for a
Group III offense “wanton or willful
neglect in performing assigned duties” and had received a five day
suspension for that violation, the Disciplinary Code states the penalty for a
second Group III offense is discharge. M.R. had previously been disciplined for
a Group II offense for four occurrences of unscheduled absences resulting in
eight days of absences in a thirty day period without a doctor’s note and
received a three day suspension for this violation.
There
was a considerable amount of testimony about the hours of negotiations, the need
for M.R. to request PTO, as well as the time the Grievant left the building to
meet with his private attorney. The
testimony of various witnesses indicated that the hours of negotiations varied.
Negotiations concluded anytime between 3:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m.
When formal negotiations concluded early, the participants were directed
to continue working on negotiations. There
was testimony that one worker requested PTO for one half day and there was
testimony that the Grievant should have turned in a PTO since he planned to
leave early as well as testimony from a supervisor who indicated that he would
not have required M.R. to provide a request for PTO. There was conflicting testimony about the time the Grievant
actually left the negotiating session. Testimony
that the Grievant left at 3:00 or 3:10 was corroborated by County witnesses
including the testimony of the Union President. The Grievant and the Secretary
to the Union testified that M.R. was in L.O.’s office and left at 3:45 or
3:50. The motivation and
credibility of this testimony does not need to be determined since it is clear
that the Grievant did not put in a full work day as the other members of the
negotiating team did. Negotiations
actually concluded at 4:30 p.m. The Grievant was not present.
The
Grievant denied references concerning the need to request PTO but did indicate
at the “due process hearing”
that he “forgot” to fill it out. Did
the grievant knowingly falsify County or Public records?
His supervisor was told to put him down for eight (8) hours paid. (Joint
Exhibit 4) The Grievant was aware that he did not work eight hours and
I
believe he intentionally falsified his hours.
Whether he left at 3:00, 3:10 (County witnesses’ testimony) or 3:45,
3:50 (Union witnesses’ testimony) is not critical. What is critical is that he did not work a full day for which
he was paid and did not fill out a PTO form as instructed to by his Union
President and required by the Agreement and that he gave false information about
his work hours on October 7. The Grievant had on many previous occasions
requested and been granted PTO in order to meet with his attorney. Critical to
the case is the fact that M.R. did not have any PTO credit in his bank.
The
Collective Bargaining Agreement requires “just cause” for the Company to
discipline or discharge an employee
Discharge is recognized to be
the extreme industrial penalty since the employee’s job, seniority and other
contractual benefits, and reputation are at stake.
Because of the seriousness of this penalty, the burden generally is held
to be on the employer to prove guilt of wrongdoing, and probably always so where
the agreement requires “just cause” for discharge.[1]
Therefore, it
is appropriate for an arbitrator to require clear and convincing evidence that
an employee was discharged for “just cause.” As explained by Arbitrator Richman:
The imposition of a lesser burden
than clear and convincing proof fails to give consideration to the harsh effect
of summary discharge upon the employee in terms of future employment[2]
The just cause standard has been
defined and incorporates seven tests.
1.
Did the company give the
employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the possible or probable disciplinary
consequences of the employee’s conduct?
Yes, The Code
of Conduct incorporated into the Collective Bargaining Agreement cites
falsification of public records as a serious offense which can result in
termination.
Yes.
Article 4 of the CBA – (Management Rights) exclusively reserves to the County
the right …to determine what records are
to be made and kept, including those records relating to hours of employees, who
will make and keep these records, how the records are to be made and kept,
…A memo from the Human Resource Manager sent to members of the negotiating
team including the Grievant indicated that “…employees will be required to
spend their daily working hours in collective bargaining.” Mr. Reese’s normal workday was from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30.
It did not end at 3:00, 3:10, 3:30 or 3:45.
Yes.
H.M. inquired as to whether M.R. had filled out a PTO form to cover his early
departure and learned that he had not. A review of his records indicated that he did not have any PTO
time in his bank. Furthermore, C.J.,
the Grievant’s immediate supervisor asked him how many hours he had worked and
he responded that he worked all day (8 hours.)
4. Was the employer’s
investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
Yes.
On October 18, 2004 H.M. recommended termination of Mr. Reese as of
October 19, 2004 and informed him that he had a right to refute the evidence in
support of the recommendation. In
addition, a “due process” hearing (a third step grievance) was held on
October 27, 2004. There was also a review by the Deputy County Administrator who
upheld the termination of the Grievant’s employment on Nov. 4, 2004,
5. At the
investigation, did the “judge” obtain substantial evidence or proof that the
employee was guilty as charged?
At
the hearing, the Grievant admitted that he had told G.H., the Union President that he would be filing a PTO request but that “he
forgot.” He also admitted that when asked for payroll information for October
7, he told C.J. that he had worked 8 hours. In addition, the Grievant indicated
that he was not going to make excuses for not filling out a PTO request.
He said, ”Write me up, fire me, do whatever you are going to do.”
6. Has the company
applied its rules, orders and penalties evenhandedly and without discrimination
to all employees?
There
was no testimony to the contrary
7. Was the degree of
discipline administered by the company in a particular case reasonably related
to (a) the seriousness of the proven offense and (b) the record of the employee
in his service with the company?[3]
Yes.
Mr. Reese has been an employee for two years, a relatively short period
of time, and within this time period he has been disciplined three times. He was
disciplined for leaving a knife/scraper in a prison cell and less than two
months later he was disciplined for unexcused absences from work and in this
instance he was disciplined for falsification of records.
The “just
cause” standard is a broad and elastic concept, involving a balance of
interests and notions of fundamental fairness.
The applicable standard is one of reasonableness:
…whether a reasonable person taking into account
all relevant circumstances would find sufficient justification in the conduct of
the employee to warrant discharge (or discipline.) [4]
I have
considered all of the arguments presented by both sides and conclude that the
Grievant did, in fact, knowingly cause the falsification of County records by
reporting false information to be recorded on his time sheet..
The facts and
testimony in evidence compel a finding that the County has just cause to
discharge the Grievant under Article 37 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
(Joint Exhibit 1: Article 37: Section 3 and Exhibit A – Disciplinary Code)
.
The
Collective Bargaining Agreement has not been violated.
The Grievance
is denied in all respects and the discharge is sustained.
AWARD
Based on the evidence and testimony entered at the
hearing, the Employee’s grievance is denied in all respects. The County did have just cause to terminate Michael Reese and
his discharge is sustained.
DATED: __June 21, 2005__________
_____________________________
Phyllis Almenoff, Arbitrator
State
of New York
)
)
County
of Nassau )
I, Phyllis Almenoff, do hereby affirm that I am the individual described herein and who executed this instrument which is my award.
[1] Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 905 (5th Ed. 1987).
[2] General Telephone Company of California, 73 LA 531, 533 (Richman, 1979
[3] Enterprise Wire Co., 46 LA 359, 363-4 (1966)
[4] RCA Communications, Inc. 29 LA 567, 571 (Harris, 1961) See also Riley Stoker Corp., 7 LA 764, 767 (Platt, 1947)
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