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Title: State of Oregon, Department of State Police and Oregon State Police Officers Association 
Date: January 8, 1993 
Arbitrator: Luella E. Nelson 
Citation: 1993 NAC 109

 

In the matter of arbitration between:


Oregon State Police Officers Association ,

                           and

State of Oregon, 
Department of State Police 

,

 

 

RE:     Grievances of Hickey,

             Elliott, and VonBeroldigen

            Regarding Plain Clothes

LUELLA E. NELSON, Arbitrator

 

                                                                                            


ARBITRATOR'S
OPINION AND AWARD

           This Arbitration arises pursuant to Agreement between OREGON STATE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION ("Association"), and STATE OF OREGON, DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE ("State"), under which LUELLA E. NELSON was selected to serve as Arbitrator and under which her Award shall be final and binding upon the parties.

            Hearing was held on October 28, 1992, in Salem, Oregon.  The parties had the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, introduce relevant exhibits, and argue the issues in dispute.  Both parties filed post-hearing briefs on or about December 11, 1992.

APPEARANCES:

            On behalf of the Association:

Daryl S. Garrettson, Esquire, Aitchison, Hoag, Vick & Tarantino, 1300 SW 5th, Suite 3300, Portland, OR   97201

            On behalf of the State:

Josephine Hawthorne, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, (Charles S. Crookham, Attorney General, on brief), Depart­ment of Justice, 100 Justice Building, Salem, OR   97310

ISSUE

Whether or not Telecommunicators and the Forensic Scientist are entitled to a plainclothes allowance?

RELEVANT SECTIONS OF AGREEMENTS

1991-1993 AGREEMENT (A-1)

ARTICLE 25 - COMPENSATION

                ...

                25.6 Uniform Allowance

                The Employer agrees to provide required uniforms and equip­ment for employees in the bargaining unit.  The Employer agrees to repair or replace both personal and Employer-owned uniforms, equipment and property damaged or destroyed on duty unless gross negligence can be shown on the part of the employee.  ...

                Receipts will be required prior to payment by the Employer.  Repair or replacement of non-listed items shall not exceed reasonable costs for only those items which are normally associated with an employee's on-duty status.  The Employer agrees to provide each employee in the bargaining unit required to wear a uniform, the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25) per month for cleaning the uniform. ...

                25.7 Plainclothes Allowance

                Employees authorized in writing to perform normal day-to-day duties in civilian clothing, including identification employees shall be reimbursed for a clothing allowance of up to eight hundred dollars ($800) actual cost per biennium and twenty-five dollars ($25) per month cleaning allowance.  Employees shall be eligible for this allowance if they serve all or part of the biennium in assignments eligible for the allowance.  However, communication systems analysts shall be reimbursed for a clothing allowance up to seventy-five dollars ($75) actual cost per fiscal year.  A receipt shall be required to document actual cost for all clothing allowances.

                ....

1989-1991 AGREEMENT (A-2)

ARTICLE 25 - COMPENSATION

                ...

                25.6 Uniform Allowance

                The Employer agrees to provide required uniforms and equipment for employees in the bargaining unit.  The Employer agrees to repair or replace both personal and Employer-owned uniforms, equipment and property damaged or destroyed on duty unless gross negligence can be shown on the part of the employee. ...

                Receipts will be required prior to payment by the Employer.  Repair or replacement of non-listed items shall not exceed reasonable costs for only those items which are normally associated with an officer's on-duty status.  The Employer agrees to provide each employee in the bargaining unit required to wear a uniform, the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25) per month for cleaning the uniform. ...

                25.7 Plainclothes Allowance

                Employees authorized in writing to perform normal day-to-day duties in civilian clothing, including identification employees, shall be reimbursed for a clothing allowance of up to eight hundred dollars ($800) actual cost per biennium and twenty-five dollars ($25) per month cleaning allowance.  Employees shall be eligible for this allowance if they serve all or part of the biennium in assignments eligible for the allowance.  However, communication systems analysts shall be reimbursed for a clothing allowance up to seventy-five dollars ($75) actual cost per fiscal year.  A receipt shall be required to document actual cost for all clothing allowances.

                ....

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT executed 11-30-90 and 12-4-90 (A-3)

                ...

                (1) Except as specifically provided below, all provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Association and the State shall be fully applicable to the Research Analyst IV's.

                ...

                (4) Articles 25.3 and 25.7 are not applicable to Research Analyst IV's.

                ....

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT executed 10-10-90 (A-4)

                ...

                (1) Except as specifically provided below, all provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Association and the State shall be fully applicable to the Dispatchers as of September 26, 1990.

                ...

                (9) Articles 25.3, 25.6 and 25.7 are not applicable to dispatchers.

                ....

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

                ORS 181.120  Standard uniform for state police.  The State of Oregon shall provide the members of the state police with standard uniforms.  Subject to detailed regulations and specifications prescribed by the superintendent, the uniform to be worn by members of the state police shall be of standard pattern and distinctive design.

 

                ORS 181.130  Service without wearing uniform.  The superintendent may direct that members of the state police shall serve without wearing uniform, when, in the judgment of the superintendent, law enforcement will thereby be made more efficient.

 

                ORS 181.140  Wearing uniforms by other persons prohibited.  (1)  No person other than a member of the Oregon State Police shall wear, use or order to be worn or used, copy or imitate in any respect or manner the standard uniforms specified in ORS 181.120.

                (2)  As used in this section, "person" includes agents, officers and officials elected or appointed by any municipality or county.

 

FACTS

            This case involves requests for clothing allowances by non-sworn (civilian) employees.  Those employees hold the job titles of Forensic Scientist (formerly Research Analyst IV) and Telecommunicators (formerly Dispatchers).  Unlike simi­lar civilian classifications in some police agencies, they do not have uniforms.  The State denied the requests on the bases that Grievants had not been author­ized in writing to perform duties in civilian cloth­ing; the State had never author­ized reimbursement for clothing for civilian employees; and the Agreement did not provide for such reimbursement.

            All Department employees are subject to written dress codes.  The dress code for non-sworn personnel requires them to be "neat and clean" and de­scribes acceptable and unacceptable clothing.  Those non-sworn employees who have uniforms must maintain and wear their uniforms in a "neat and clean manner consistent with duties performed."

            Uniformed sworn officers are subject to a lengthy and detailed dress code aimed at ensuring a uniform appearance.  For example, the dress code itemizes the pieces that comprise the various uniforms and describes the instances in which each type of uniform may be worn.  It gives detailed instructions for posi­tioning and maintaining the parts of the uniform; lists the additional equipment that may be carried; and includes diagrams showing the placement of insignia.  A separate policy governs personal grooming standards such as hair length, jewelry, and cosmetics.  It also briefly describes acceptable civilian clothing when working out of uniform.

Bargaining History

            The predecessor language to Article 25.7 first appeared in the 1985-87 Agreement as a result of an interest arbitration procedure.  The Arbitrator in that case observed that the language reflected the State's preexisting practice.  The parties have since made minor language changes.

            The classifications at issue were added to the bargaining unit in 1990 as a result of a ruling by the Employment Relations Board (ERB).  Until that addi­tion, almost all unit employees were sworn.[1]  Fol­low­ing the 1990 ERB decision, the parties negotiated bridge agreements to fold the newly-included classifica­tions into the existing Agreement.  In those negotiations, the State proposed to exclude the newly-included employees from several benefits, including the plainclothes allowance.  Labor Relations Manager Cathy Schuh, the State's chief negotiator, argued that the benefits were linked to sworn status and were inappropriate for non-sworn employees.  Attorney Will Aitchison, who served as the Association's chief spokesperson, testified that Schuh acknowledged at the time that, but for the exemption, those benefits would apply to the disputed classifications.  Schuh denies having taken this position.

            In the 1991 contract negotiations, the State proposed to add a requirement for advance supervisory approval and a time limit for submitting reimbursement claims, to increase the cleaning allowance, and to make employees simply "eligible for reimbursement" instead of unequivocally entitling them to reimbursement.  It did not propose language to continue the disputed employees' explicit exclusion from plainclothes reimbursement.

            The Association proposed to eliminate the requirement for written authori­za­­tion and to add the words "and Research Analysts" to the description of employ­­ees authorized to receive plainclothes reimbursement.  It also sought an increase in the clothing allowance for CSA's.  The Association proposed to include the Research Analyst IV (now Forensic Scientist) in the plainclothes allowance because of a specific request by the incumbent in that position.   The Forensic Scientist works closely with a Criminalist 3--a sworn officer--and believed she should get the same plainclothes allowance as her co-worker.[2]

            Aitchison testified he believed the additional language was unne­ces­sary to achieve the result sought, but the Association proposed it in an abundance of caution.  Regarding Article 25.7, Aitchison commented in negotiations, "we want to make sure [the Forensic Scientist] gets the plainclothes allowance line 16 so we would include her in that ...."  The final tentative agreement does not mention this clause and provides that anything not subject to a tentative agreement is "per current contract language."

            Aitchison testified that plainclothes reimbursement for the Forensic Scientist remained in the Union's proposals until the last day of negotiations.  He testified that the State had "come around" by the last session and included this proposal in its submission to the interest arbitrator.  Similarly, Schuh testified that the State included the Forensic Scientist in its pre-arbitration proposals, although she was uncertain whether that provision remained in the submission to the interest arbitrator.  Aitchison's recol­lec­tion was that he withdrew the language and agreed simply to use the term "employees," which he had previously explained meant "all employees in the unit."  Schuh testified that no reason was given for withdrawing the language, but that it simply fell by the wayside in reaching the final tentative agreement.  Aitchison testified that Schuh never took the position that "employees" did not apply to all unit employees for purposes of Article 25.7.

            Schuh testified that the parties did not discuss the Association's reasons for withdrawing the proposal for reimbursing the Forensic Scientist.  Her recol­lec­tion was that Aitchison never took the position that "employees" picked up the newly-added employees for purposes of Article 25.7.  She testified that, as a housekeeping measure, the parties changed the word "officers" to "employees" throughout the Agreement.  She agrees that the term "employ­ees" refers to all unit employees unless limited in some fashion.

            In Article 25.6, the parties replaced the reference to "officer's" with "employ­ee's" in the sentence that previously read, "Repair or replacement of non-listed items shall not exceed reasonable costs for only those items which are normally associated with an officer's on-duty status."  In discussing this provision, Aitchison commented "we just want to reflect that we are now dealing not just with officers--change that to employees."  The parties made the same language change at other places where the word "officer" appeared.

            The Association alleges that the issue of the plainclothes allowance arose again in December 1991 discussions of plans to replace the Criminalist 3 class­ifi­ca­tion with non-sworn personnel.  In that discussion, the Association's representatives recalled asking if non-sworn employees "including [the Forensic Scientist]" got the allow­ance, and getting the response that they would receive it.  The State's repre­sent­a­tives in those talks deny that this exchange oc­curred; Schuh testified that she would have corrected any such misrepresenta­tion.  This exchange is not reflected in the Association's notes of the meeting.  The Letter of Agreement that resulted from these discussions does not address the issue of plainclothes reimbursement.  It gives current Criminalist 3's the option of relinquishing "sworn status and all future benefits attached to that status" if they elect reassignment to the non-sworn Forensic Scientist classification.

POSITION OF THE ASSOCIATION

            The Arbitrator must apply clear and unambiguous contract language.  Se­con­­dary interpretation aids, such as bargaining history and the parties' intent, do not come into play unless the Arbitrator concludes the language is ambiguous.

            Article 25.7 is clear and unambiguous.  None of its terms lend themselves to any ambiguity.  If an individual is an "employee" who is "assigned in writing" to perform normal day to day duties in civilian clothing, that individual is entitled to the plainclothes allowance.  The question of whether the disputed employees were "authorized in writing" goes to the application of Article 25.7 to a specific set of employees, not the meaning of the language.

            The word "employees" is not ambiguous.  As used in the Agreement, "em­ployee" cannot be construed to mean either "sworn employee" or any subset of the Association less than the entirety of the Association's membership.  Through­out the Agreement, the word "employee" desig­nates all unit employees.  This use of the term "employee" comports with the general definition of that term in Oregon labor law.  It is inappropriate to search for ambiguity where none exists.

            Even if the term "employee" is ambiguous, secondary contract construction rules compel the result that "employee" means all employees in the unit.  The bargaining history demonstrates that the parties viewed the term "employee" to include all unit employees.  Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary for the bridge agreements to specifically exclude some positions from certain benefits, including Article 25.7.  In the 1991 negotiations, the parties agreed to replace the phrase "sworn employee" in Article 25.6 with the term "employee."  In negotiating this change, the Association specifically informed the State that the term "em­ployee" meant all unit employees, and that the intent was to expand the benefits of that Article to more than simply "sworn employees."

            The term "employee" must be construed in the context of the whole Agreement.  Article 21.4 demonstrates that the parties know how to use contract language to distinguish between the benefit levels for sworn and non-sworn employees.  It also demonstrates that the State sought and achieved such a distinction in a section of the Agreement other than Article 25.7.  To grant a sworn/non-sworn distinction in Article 25.7 would reward the State through arbi­tra­tion with what it did not seek through negotiations.

            The parties' expressed intent in negotiations supports the Association's interpreta­tion.  Aitchison explained in negotiations that "employee" included all employees.  The State's witnesses could recall no instance where the Association's representa­tives gave a definition that included less than the entire unit.  The State's witnesses conceded that no State representative provided a defini­tion of "employee" that included less than the entire unit.  Based on the earlier bridge negotiations, the Association could only conclude that the provisions of Article 25.7 would apply to the disputed classifications but for a specific exception.

            Contemporaneous extra-negotiations statements regarding the interpretation of the language also support the Association's reading.  The December 1991 meet­ing regarding Criminalist 3's occurred within weeks of the final settlement of the Agreement.  It involved many of the same players who had been involved in re­solv­ing the contract negotiations.  The issue of the plainclothes allowance for the Forensic Scientist was of importance to the Association.  The Association's witnesses clearly recalled the exchange.

            The disputed employees are "assigned in writing" to plainclothes responsi­bil­ities within the meaning of the Agreement.  The State's rules and regulations specifically allow these employees to perform their usual duties in civilian clothes.  The State imposed a dress code for them which governed the type of civilian cloth­ing to be worn.  The State did not provide uniforms for the disputed employ­ees, although it could do so if it chose to, and thus required them to perform their duties in civilian clothing.

            Criminalists receive the plainclothes allowance under no different assign­ment policy than the disputed employees.  No Criminalist has received a written document specifically instructing the Criminalist to wear civilian clothing.  Rather, they have been told to comply with the dress code.  Under the parties' clear practice, assignment to a job which is subject to the written mandatory dress code entitles the employee to a plainclothes allowance.  There need be no specific written instructions which individually tell the employee to wear civilian clothes.

            The State's position is illogical.  The Forensic Scientist works in the Crime Lab as a DNA specialist.  She works alongside a sworn Criminalist who is also a DNA specialist, and alongside other sworn Criminalists performing Crime Lab duties.  None of those individuals ever received a specific written instruction to perform their duties in civilian clothes.  The Forensic Scientist and the Criminalist are subject to the same mandatory dress code.  However, the State has never denied Criminalists the plainclothes allowance.

            The Arbitrator should sustain the grievance.

POSITION OF THE STATE

            The Association has the burden of proof.  It has not proven by a pre­ponderance of the evidence that Article 25.7 applies to employees in the disputed classifications; that it orally communicated its belief that Article 25.7 applied to those employees; or that the State ever agreed that Article 25.7 applied to them.  The Association submitted no written evidence supporting its position.  Instead, it relies primarily on inferences arising out of the bridge agreements.  An infer­ence is not proof.  In the absence of proof, an inference is only speculation.

            Article 25.7 must be understood within its statutory context.  ORS 181.120 requires the State to provide uniforms for sworn officers.  This makes such officers readily identifiable by citizens.  The value of this identification outweighs the cost of the uniforms.  ORS 181.130 merely permits the State to direct some officers not to wear uniforms and permit them to wear "plainclothes."  Because the State was required to provide uniforms, it agreed to provide an allowance to members directed to work out of the provided uniform.  Without a plainclothes allowance, plainclothes officers would have been deprived of the economic benefit of paid work clothes.

            Before non-sworn classifications were accreted into the unit, the application of Article 25.7 was unambiguous.  That Article remains clearly inapplicable to employees in the disputed classifications, because the language of the Article clearly does not apply to these classifications.

            The generic term "employees" in Article 25.7 now includes employees in the disputed classifications.  However, a plain and sensible reading of the language of Article 25.7, as understood within its statutory context, shows that it was never intended to apply to non-uniformed employees and the State never agreed to so apply it.  Article 25.7 remains unambiguous and requires no interpretation or evidence as to bargaining history.  The language excludes employees in the dis­puted classifications because it presupposes employees who perform their "normal day-to-day duties" in clothes other than civilian clothing--i.e., uniforms.  The clothes Grievants wear while performing their "normal day-to-day duties" are, and always have been, civilian clothes.  These employees have never had a required uniform.  On its face, Article 25.7 excludes these employees from the plainclothes allowance.

            The Association produced no evidence that the disputed employees serve in "assignments eligible for the allowance," as required in Article 25.7.  Logically, such assignments must be assignments that preclude the wearing of statutorily-required uniforms.  Only sworn officers may wear the required uniform.

            Article 25.7 establishes three conditions for eligibility for the plainclothes allowance.  (1)  The employee must perform normal, daily duties in provided clothing--here, the required uniform--that is not civilian attire.  (2)  The employee must be authorized in writing to perform daily duties in civilian attire rather than in the required uniform.  This authorization may be a written assign­ment to perform such work as, e.g., detective or criminalist.  (3)  The employee must serve all or part of the biennium in assignments eligible for the allowance.  The disputed employees did not meet any one of these conditions, much less all three.  These employees do not wear a required uniform, are not authorized in writing to wear clothes that are not the required uniform, and do not serve in assignments eligible for the plainclothes allowance.

            Article 25.7, read in its entirety, clearly excluded the newly-incorporat­ed classifications.  No further clarification was needed.  The language of Article 25.7 clearly excluded these employees, even when using the generic term "employees."  Therefore, the State did not propose any change in the language of the Article.

            The clear exclusion of the disputed employees in the bridge agreements does not suggest that such employees other­wise would be entitled to the plain­clothes allowance.  The bridge agreements were intended to bridge incorporation into the unit of employees previously uncovered and uncontemplated at the time of earlier negotiations.  The parties stated those articles which would not apply to the new unit members.  If the parties agreed in later negotiations to include the newly-incorporated employees in certain articles, the contractual language could be modified as necessary.

            If the bridge agreements had not specifically excluded Article 25.7 but had excluded other Articles, the Association would have argued that the disputed classifications were impliedly included.  Either way, the Association could argue that it had no need to submit a written proposal on Article 25.7.  A contract should not be built based upon "implied admissions" in a bridge agreement.

            The Association proposed a language change to add the Forensic Scientist to Article 25.7.  The State did not agree to this proposal.  It is inconsistent for the Association to seek inclusion for one classification in negotiations, then assert later at arbitration that inclusion is unnecessary for both.

            It is irrelevant that Aitchison said in negotiations that "employees" included employees in the newly-added classifications.   The State does not contend that the term "employees," in and of itself, excludes these employees from the coverage of Article 25.7.  Other language in Article 25.7 creates the exclusion.  The State disputes the Association's claim that it clearly and explicitly informed the State in bargaining of its position that Article 25.7 entitled these non-sworn employees to the plainclothes allowance.  The Association has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it communicated that position or that the State received and understood that to be the Association's position.

            At no point in bargaining did Aitchison clearly state that the plainclothes allowance applied to the disputed employees.  His reference to "dealing not just with officers--change that to employees," is obviously to Article 25.6, not Article 25.7.  The only reference to the disputed classifications in the discussion of Article 25.7 was a passing comment about getting the allowance for the Forensic Scientist.  If Article 25.7 clearly applied to all the disputed employees, the Association had no need to make sure that the Forensic Scientist got the allow­ance.  Aitchison did not say the Association's position was that the allowance ap­plied to all employees, including the Forensic Scientist and the Telecommunicat­ors, because that was not the Association's position in bargaining.

            It makes no sense for the Association to communicate such a significant position orally.  If the Association intended to communicate its position clearly, it would have made a written proposal.  Having failed to make a clear proposal, the Union seeks to infer that because the State did not affirma­tively renew the exclusion of the two classifications, employees in those classifications are covered despite the plain language of Article 25.7.  The Association seeks to get through arbitration what it could not obtain in bargaining.

            The personal appearance policy is not the written authorization specified by Article 25.7.  It is obviously a dress code for persons who already come to work in civilian clothing.  As with any dress code, it simply provides guidance on appropriate and inappropriate civilian attire in the workplace.  It could have been promulgated by any public or private employer.  It is not the necessary "writ­ten authorization" because employees in these classifications have no re­quired alternative clothing provided by the State to wear to work in lieu of their civilian clothing.  This personal appearance policy for non-sworn personnel superseded one dated April 1, 1988.  The State had a policy that long predated the one in evidence.  A long-standing civilian dress code cannot suddenly transmute into the written authorization required by Article 25.7.

            The State has extensive appearance policies for all employees, including uniformed members.  The policies applicable to sworn personnel are comparatively detailed and specific.  Sworn members are to be in their uniforms unless the State has authorized them to be in other attire.  No similar authorization is even referenced in the policy for non-sworn employees.  The written work assignment itself can constitute the written authorization.  Sworn members working in the Crime Lab are working in "assignments eligible for the allowance."  The disputed employees are not serving in assignments eligible for the allowance.  Those members currently working as Criminalists will be the last to receive a plain­clothes allowance when the classification is civilianized.

            The plainclothes allowance is a significant monetary benefit.  The parties did not clearly and unequivocally agree to extend that benefit to these employ­ees.  There was no meeting of the minds on extending the plainclothes allowance to these classifications.  The Association never sent a message, oral or written, on the issue.  It made only a half-hearted attempt to include the Forensic Scientist, which died with the tentative agreement.  The parties should have the opportunity to bargain openly over this benefit rather than through inference.  If the Arbitrator has any doubt that the language excludes the two disputed classifications, the issue should be remanded to the parties for open and fair negotiations at the next bargaining session.

OPINION

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

            As the moving party in this contract interpreta­tion dispute, the Union bears the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that its view of the meaning of the disputed language is correct.

            The applicable standards for interpreting a collective bargaining agreement are well settled.  Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the Arbitrator must give effect to the intent expressed in that language.  That is so even where one party finds the result unusual, unexpected, or harsh.  Words must be given their ordinary meaning, unless evidence exists that the parties used them with a specialized meaning in mind contrary to common usage of the term.  Language may be deemed clear even though the parties dis­agree concerning its meaning.

            A party's unexpressed intent in negotiating a contract is of no import in interpreting the language.  Evidence of bar­gain­ing history or past practice cannot alter the plain meaning of the language.  However, such evi­dence can shed light on ambiguous language, illustrate that a latent ambiguity exists in the language, or show that the parties intended a specialized meaning contrary to the common usage of a term.

THE MERITS

            Article 25.7 is clear and unambiguous.  It bestows plain­clothes reimburse­ment on "[e]mployees authorized in writing to perform normal day-to-day duties in civilian clothing" so long as they "serve all or part of the biennium in assignments eligible for the allowance."

            Although the term "employees" is a general one, Article 25.7 limits the assignments eligible for reimbursement by using two terms of art--"plainclothes" and "civilian clothing."  In common parlance and in the law enforcement world, the term "plainclothes" refers to the garb of a police officer working out of uniform.  The term "civilian clothing" has a similar but broader meaning, in that it may describe non-uniform attire worn by other uniformed personnel in addition to police.  Thus, giving the words of Article 25.7 their common, ordi­nary meaning, that provision authorizes reimbursement for work clothing worn by uniformed per­­son­nel when not in uniform.[3]

            The Association has not established that the parties discussed or agreed on a broader meaning of either "plainclothes" or "civilian clothing" than that in ordinary use.  It is unnecessary to consider the remaining evidence of past practice and bargaining history.  The plain language of the Agreement precludes plainclothes reimburse­ment for the disputed classifications. 

AWARD

            Telecommunicators and the Forensic Scientist are not entitled to a plainclothes allowance.

DATED:  January 8, 1993

                                                                                                                                                            

                                                                                            LUELLA E. NELSON - Arbitrator


    [1]       The exception, Communica­tions Systems Analysts ("CSA's"), evolved from a sworn classifica­tion of Communications Specialists.  The non-sworn CSA's retained many of the benefits the prior sworn classifi­ca­tion had enjoyed.  They have a uniform that does not include a badge; the prior sworn employees' uniform included a badge.  They do not have written authori­zation for plainclothes, but do wear civilian clothes at times.

    [2]      Criminal­ist 3's work in the Crime Lab and at crime scenes.  At least one incumbent has never received anything in writing directing him to wear plain­clothes.  They wear civilian clothes, and also have the option of wearing "Game Uniforms" at crime scenes.  The Forensic Scientist is legally blind, and works only at the Crime Lab.  She and one of the Criminalist 3's are DNA analysts.

    [3]       It is unnecessary on this record to consider whether this language would encompass ordinary clothing worn by non-sworn personnel to whom uniforms were issued.  Although some police jurisdictions issue uniforms to dispatchers, this one does not.

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